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I.  INTRODUCTION 
America’s appetite for incarceration has exhausted state 
budgets, pushed prisons to dangerous levels of overcapacity, and 
decimated communities.  In 2013, the United States confined over 
1.5 million people in state and federal prisons1 and thus continued 
its reign as the world’s incarceration leader, both in the number of 
people it incarcerates and its rates of incarceration.2  Since 1980, 
the national population has grown by approximately 40%,3 but its 
incarceration rate has grown by nearly 800%.4  In a 2013 speech to 
the American Bar Association, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
decried widespread incarceration at the federal, state, and local 
levels as “both ineffective and unsustainable” and assailed the 
“significant economic burden” and “human and moral costs that 
are impossible to calculate” which result from this phenomenon.5  
Indeed, states now spend about $50 billion a year housing 
prisoners,6 a figure second only to Medicaid spending.7  As of 2008, 
more than 1 in every 100 adults—and more than 1 in every 15 
                                                                                                                   
 1 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247282, 
PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.  
 2 Roy Walmsley, International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Population List 1 
(10th ed. 2014), http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloa 
ds/wppl_10.pdf. 
 3 See Pop Culture: 1980, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/thro 
ugh_the_decades/fast_facts/1980_new.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (depicting the total 
U.S. resident population in 1980 as 226,542,199); USA People QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) 
(estimating the total U.S. population in 2013 at 316,128,839). 
 4 Charlie Savage, Justice Department Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-dr 
ug-sentences.html?pagewanted=all.  Between 1985 and 2010, the state prison population 
grew by 204%, and states’ correctional spending rose by 674%.  VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CONTINUING FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: SETTING A NEW COURSE 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/The-continuing-fiscal-crisis-in-co 
rrections-10-2010-updated.pdf.  The total prison population dropped each year between 
2010 and 2012 but began climbing again in 2013.  See CARSON, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5 Savage, supra note 4 (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder).  
 6 Carrie Johnson, Budget Crunch Forces A New Approach To Prisons, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Feb. 15, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133760412/budget-crunch-forces-a 
-new-approach-to-prisons. 
 7 Adam Skolnick, Runaway Prison Costs Thrash State Budgets, FISCAL TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2011, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/02/09/Runaway-Prison-Costs-Thrash-State 
-Budgets. 
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African American men8—had been incarcerated.  Many prisons are 
operating significantly over capacity,9 resulting in increased 
violence, idleness, and unrest, as well as decreased access to 
rehabilitative programs and medical and mental health care.10  
The severe overcrowding and resulting dire shortages in medical 
and mental health treatment in California prisons offer a snapshot 
into the conditions suffered by some inmates.11  
In response to these staggering economic and human costs, 
liberals and “tough on crime” conservatives have joined together to 
                                                                                                                   
 8 THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5, 7 
(Feb. 2008), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrus 
tsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein100pdf.pdf.  Because male prisoners constitute 
93% of the prisoner population in the United States, this Article will focus on male prisoners.  
HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 231675 
PRISONERS IN 2009, at 2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.  It 
is important to recognize, however, that female offenders also suffer from high rates of mental 
illness.  See Shannon M. Lynch et al., Women’s Pathways to Jail: Examining Mental Health, 
Trauma, and Substance Abuse, BJA POLICY BRIEF 3 (2013), http://www.bja.gov/Publications/ 
WomensPathwaysToJail.pdf (finding that 32% of female participants in a multisite jail study 
met criteria for a serious mental illness in the past year).  Indeed, any recommendation for 
sentence modification based on the negative impact of incarceration upon the mentally ill 
could impact a larger proportion of female offenders than male offenders. See id. at 1 (listing 
studies showing that female offenders report greater incidence of serious mental illness than 
male offenders).  I am grateful to Professor Michelle Jacobs for this important insight. 
 9 See, e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 21 tbl.2 (2013), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf (showing that federal prisons 
operated at 38% over capacity in fiscal year 2012, with overcrowding at medium and high 
security male prisons at or near 50%); E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NC5243920, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN 
ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 26 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/conte 
nt/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf (“Based on their reported custody counts, 18 states and the 
[Bureau of Prisons] were operating prison systems above 100% of their maximum reported 
facility capacity.”). 
 10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-743 GROWING INMATE CROWDING 
NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 18–19, 21 (2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf; Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: 
Harmful Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 265, 272–73, 281 (2006); Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional 
Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS 
L.J. 313, 336, 351 (1983).   
 11 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–26 (2011) (detailing the conditions of 
incarceration exacerbated by overcrowding and noting the resulting suffering of mentally ill 
inmates); Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-01351TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 3, 2005) (“By all accounts, the California prison medical care system is broken beyond 
repair.  The harm already done in this case to California’s prison inmate population could 
not be more grave, and the threat of future injury and death is virtually guaranteed in the 
absence of drastic action.”). 
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call for significant criminal justice reform12  Following the lead of 
trailblazers such as Texas,13 Kansas,14 and Missouri,15 states have 
instituted various reforms to reduce prison populations and 
correctional spending, including increased use and diversity of 
early-release measures.16  Specifically, recent reports show that 
states are expanding their use of good-time credits, enlarging 
parole eligibility, and authorizing the “compassionate release” of 
costly and low-risk ill or elderly inmates.17  
Inspired by these measures and the need to ensure just and 
appropriate punishment, the American Law Institute has 
proposed two judicial sentence modification provisions in the 
revised sentencing articles of the Model Penal Code.  The first, 
proposed at Section 305.6, would authorize prisoners who have 
served at least fifteen years of any sentence of incarceration to 
apply for sentence modification, which “should be viewed as 
analogous to a resentencing in light of present circumstances.”18  
At a sentence modification hearing, the court should inquire as to 
“whether the purposes of sentencing . . . would better be served by 
a modified sentence than the prisoner’s completion of the original 
sentence.”19  The revised Model Penal Code has embraced the 
sentencing theory of limiting retributivism,20 which provides that 
                                                                                                                   
 12 E. Lea Johnston, Smoke and Mirrors: Model Penal Code § 305.7 and Compassionate 
Release, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 49, 50 & n.7 (2014). 
 13 Abby Rapoport, Prison Reform: No Longer Politically Toxic?, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 26, 
2013), http://prospect.org/article/prison-reform-no-longer-politically-toxic. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Emily M. Grant, Note, Cost Conscious Justice: The Case for Wholly-Informed 
Discretionary Sentencing in Kentucky, 100 KY. L.J. 391, 407–08 (2012). 
 16 Johnston, supra note 12, at 50 & n.8. 
 17 Id. at 50 & n.9. 
 18 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6(1), (4) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter TD-2], available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Model%20Penal%20Code%20TD 
%20No%202%20-%20online%20version.pdf.  TD-2 was approved at the May 17, 2011 Annual 
Meeting, subject to discussion at the Meeting and editorial prerogative.  See Ellen S. Podgor, 
The Sentencing Project, ALI ANNUAL MEETING BLOG (May 17, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://2011am. 
ali.org/blog.cfm?startrow=11 (noting that the tentative draft was overwhelmingly approved).  
For purposes of variety, this Article uses the terms “judicial sentence modification,” “sentence 
modification,” and “resentencing” interchangeably.  As indicated in the text, this Article 
envisions that a court at a sentence modification hearing would perform essentially a 
resentencing function.  See infra note 285. 
 19 TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6(4). 
 20 Professor Norval Morris was the progenitor of the theory of limiting retributivism, and 
his theoretical writings inspired the sentencing philosophy adopted by the revised Model 
Penal Code, as expressed in Section 1.02(2).  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) 
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individual sentences should occur within the bounds of deserved 
punishment while allowing for the accommodation of a number of 
crime-control goals (such as rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
incapacitation) as well as restorative and reintegrative 
objectives.21  The second measure, proposed at Section 305.7, 
would authorize judges to reduce a prison sentence at any time for 
any “compelling” reason that sufficiently affects the purposes of 
sentencing.22  Commentary to this provision indicates that 
sentence modification may be particularly warranted as a response 
to the unjust punishment experienced by inmates with disabling 
mental disorders.23 
This Article examines whether the dispositional options 
available for sentence modification suffice to address unjust 
punishment.24  A judge’s sentence modification options, under the 
proposed Model Penal Code provisions and in general, are typically 
limited to the alternatives that would have been available at an 
original sentencing.25  Potential options often include immediate 
release, shortened terms of confinement with future release, and 
                                                                                                                   
cmt. b, at 4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) [hereinafter TD-1], available at http://www.ali. 
org/00021333/mpc_2007.pdf.  Morris’s most important writings on the theory of limiting 
retributivism include NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND 
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990), 
NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1982), 
and NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1974).  
For a detailed analysis of Morris’s work, see Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in 
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting 
Retributivism] and Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, in 22 
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). This Article 
accepts, without evaluation or critique, the American Law Institute’s determination that 
limiting retributivism is a sound approach to sentencing. 
 21 See TD-1, supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(a) (listing the restoration of victims and the 
reintegration of offenders among the goals of the proposed sentencing system).  
 22 TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7(1), (7). 
 23 Id. § 305.7 cmt. b. 
 24 This Article endorses and incorporates the reasons outlined by the American Law 
Institute for entrusting judges, as opposed to other institutional actors, with central 
authority over sentencing.  See id. § 305.6 cmt. d, § 305.7 cmt. c & app. B; infra notes 85–91 
and accompanying text (arguing for expanding the use of sentence modification).  
 25 Proposed provisions 305.6 and 305.7 authorize judges to impose any sanction or 
combination of sanctions that would have been available to the original sentencing judge.  
See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6(5), § 305.6(5) cmt. g, § 305.7(8), § 305.7(8) cmt. i.  However, 
the provisions exempt judges at sentence modification hearings from complying with 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.  Id. 
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parole or other forms of conditional release.26  This Article explores 
the exercise of these alternatives as remedies for prisoners with 
serious mental illnesses,27 a population especially likely to face 
certain forms of unjust punishment through poor conditions of 
confinement.28  Narrowing the population at issue allows for a 
more nuanced examination of the various manifestations of 
unjustness and an easier identification of a gap in remedial 
coverage.  The Article’s analysis reveals that typical modification 
options, while appropriate and sufficient for many disordered 
offenders, do not permit judges to redress the unjust punishment 
of those prisoners who must remain incarcerated but for whom 
incarceration in current conditions constitutes a disproportionately 
severe or otherwise unjust punishment.  
To remedy this shortcoming, the Article argues that legislatures 
should authorize an additional sentence modification option 
currently not permitted by law.  Specifically, it proposes that 
states authorize judges, upon a finding of past and likely future 
unjust punishment, to modify a mentally disordered prisoner’s 
conditions of confinement in order to ensure that continued 
confinement will be a just and appropriate sanction.  Possible 
modifications could include improvements in mental health 
treatment, changes in housing, and even restricted disciplinary 
options.  A finding that correctional officials were aware of past 
unjust conditions should not be a necessary condition before 
mandating such modifications since the focus of the inquiry would 
be on the dictates of proportionate punishment and the experience 
                                                                                                                   
 26 See, e.g., id. § 305.7 cmt. i (listing potential sentence modifications); cf. 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law §§ 2138, 2139 (2014) (explaining situations in which a court may modify a 
sentence and compiling relevant cases across jurisdictions); W.S.R., Annotation, Power of 
Trial Court to Change Sentence After Affirmance, 23 A.L.R. 536 (1923) (aggregating cases 
showing the trial court’s limited power in most jurisdictions to modify a sentence after 
appellate review); Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences 
in Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2003) (compiling and summarizing state 
procedural rules on sentence modification).  
 27 See infra note 32 (defining “serious mental illness”). 
 28 See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental 
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 158–83 (2013) (detailing evidence of hardships 
experienced by prisoners with serious mental disorders); infra Part II.A & note 44. 
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of the inmate, and not on the establishment of a civil rights 
violation.29 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II presents social 
science findings concerning how individuals with serious mental 
disorders experience imprisonment.  It also identifies three forms 
of unjustness likely to be encountered by this prisoner population 
that may warrant sentence modification when a retributive notion 
of proportional punishment is an aim of sentencing.30  Part III 
evaluates the capacity of typical sentence modification options to 
address various forms of unjustness.  The assessment reveals that 
some prisoners suffering unjust punishment are currently without 
remedy.  Finally, Part IV argues that legislatures should grant 
judges a limited power to modify conditions of confinement, 
outside the context of the Eighth Amendment, when certain 
conditions can be met.  It elucidates rationales and justifications 
for this authority, identifies an analogous use of tailoring in the 
education context, and responds to possible objections. 
II.  THE EXPERIENCE OF UNJUST PUNISHMENT 
While many forms of vulnerability exist,31 individuals with 
serious mental illnesses are particularly prone to experience 
certain psychological and physical harms in prison.32 This Part 
                                                                                                                   
 29 See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (explaining why a sentence modification 
hearing should not require a demonstration of subjective awareness on the part of the 
correctional officers). 
 30 This Article does not subscribe to a particular version of retributivism, but rather 
assumes that an offender’s desert or blameworthiness serves at least a limiting purpose in 
allocating punishment.  See infra note 93. 
 31 See 28 C.F.R. § 115.41 (2014) (identifying risk factors for sexual assault in prison as 
including mental illness; physical or developmental disability; youth; diminutive size; a 
history of victimization; first, nonviolent, or sexual offender status; and perception as gay, 
bisexual, transgender, or gender-nonconforming); see also NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION 
COMM’N REPORT 7–8, 69–74 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf 
(discussing risk factors for sexual assault in prison). 
 32 By “serious” mental illnesses or mental disorders, I refer to clinical syndromes such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as chronic brain diseases that cause 
extreme distress and interfere with social and emotional adjustment.  In the fourth edition 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, these disorders were categorized as Axis I 
disorders.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 13–24, 28 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  The fifth, current 
edition of the DSM eliminates the Axis system. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 16 (5th ed. 2013).  In this Article, serious 
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surveys those harms and examines how they may impact the 
justness of an inmate’s sentence. 
A.  INMATES WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES 
Social science studies demonstrate that individuals with serious 
mental illnesses are especially likely to experience harm in 
prison.33  The default rule followed by many state correctional 
agencies, as well as the Federal Bureau of Prisons, is to house 
inmates with mental disorders within the general prison 
population at the appropriate security level.34  While the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees prisoners a right to reasonably adequate 
medical care,35 prisons generally apply the principle of least 
eligibility and deliberately maintain the level of health care a step 
below the services provided by the government outside of prison.36  
Few inmates receive care beyond prescription to older psychiatric 
                                                                                                                   
mental illness, major mental illness, and major mental disorder are used interchangeably; 
mental illness and mental disorder are used as shorthand for these serious conditions; and a 
disordered individual is assumed to have one of these serious conditions.  I hasten to add 
that I do not intend to reduce an individual to his illness by referring to him as a 
“disordered” or “mentally ill” individual; rather, I sometimes use terms such as “mentally ill 
prisoner” or “disordered prisoner” as shorthand for the more cumbersome, but more 
respectful, denomination of “prisoner with serious mental disorder,” which rightly conveys 
that an individual’s illness is but one aspect of that person. 
 33 See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 34 ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 188215, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 1, 4 (2001), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pubs/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL 
EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 128 (2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.  
 35 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (establishing “the government’s 
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration” and 
concluding “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” is “proscribed 
by the Eighth Amendment”); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains 
an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time 
fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.” (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04; Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982))).  Circuit courts of appeals have extended this 
principle to psychiatric and psychological care.  See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47–48 
(4th Cir. 1977) (holding that, under the Eighth Amendment, a prison inmate may be 
entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment).  
 36 FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 247 
(5th ed. 2011). 
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medications, which often carry more burdensome side effects than 
newer medications,37 and perhaps group therapy.38  Moreover, 
recent studies demonstrate that prisoners with serious mental 
illnesses are prone to physical and sexual victimization by staff 
and other inmates, perhaps because of their inability to 
sufficiently assess danger and modify their behavior to ward off 
attacks.39  In addition, studies confirm that prisoners with serious 
mental illnesses are more likely than non-disordered prisoners to 
violate prison rules40 and to be punished or otherwise reside in 
isolation,41 where they may be especially susceptible to 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 34, at 121–25 (examining the side effects of 
older antipsychotic medications and some prisons’ failure to monitor side effects 
appropriately); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 29–31 (5th ed. 2009) (comparing the side effects of older 
neuroleptic medications with newer atypical antipsychotics); see also Joseph Menzin et al., 
Treatment Adherence Associated With Conventional and Atypical Antipsychotics in a Large 
State Medicaid Program, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 719, 722 (2003) (“Our findings suggest 
that, compared with conventional treatment, the use of atypical therapies [i.e. newer 
medications] is associated with significantly less treatment switching and less use of 
concomitant anxiolytics [anti-anxiety] and, especially, anticholinergics.”); M. Lambert et al., 
Impact of Present and Past Antipsychotic Side Effects on Attitude Toward Typical 
Antipsychotic Treatment and Adherence, 19 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 415, 420 (2004) (finding “that 
patients experiencing antipsychotic-induced side effects . . . are at risk to develop a (more) 
negative attitude toward these medications and therefore to be risk at risk [sic] for later 
non-adherence”).  But see John Geddes et al., Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of 
Schizophrenia: Systematic Overview and Meta-Regression Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1371, 
1374 (2000) (finding that atypical and conventional antipsychotic medications were equally 
tolerable and effective overall and recommending patients only be prescribed atypical 
medications if they do not respond to treatment with conventional medications or 
experience significant side effects with conventional medications).  
 38 See E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously 
Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 636–38 nn.83–89 (2014) (detailing inmates’ 
access to medications and therapy). 
 39 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 161–69 & nn.64–101 (discussing these studies and the 
factors that may have caused the results).  A May 2013 study conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics found that prisoners with serious 
psychological distress were nine times more likely to be sexually victimized by other 
inmates (6.3% versus 0.7%), and over five times more likely to be sexually assaulted by staff 
(5.6% versus 1.1%), than inmates without a mental health problem.  ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 241399, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, at 24, 26 (2013), available at http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf.  
 40 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 170–74 & nn.113–36.  
 41 Id. at 175–76 & nn.146–50.  A 2004 report by the National Institute of Corrections 
documented that 47% of states reported subjecting mentally ill inmates who are disruptive 
to the same maximum-custody policies as non-disordered inmates.  JAMES AUSTIN & 
KENNETH MCGINNIS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NIC ACCESSION NO. 
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decompensation, psychotic break, and suicide ideation.42  Mentally 
disordered prisoners may also experience greater levels of stress 
and physical danger—and be less likely to receive adequate mental 
health care—when prisons are overcrowded.43 
Thus, inmates with serious mental illnesses provide fitting 
subjects with which to explore how conditions of confinement may 
produce disproportionate or inhumane punishment.  The next 
section provides the theoretical grounding for certain notions of 
unjust punishment, a necessary precondition before examining the 
extent to which judges can ameliorate that unjustness with 
existing sentence modification tools. 
B.  UNJUST PUNISHMENT 
A disordered offender’s conditions of confinement may render 
his punishment unjust. Indeed, the American Law Institute 
acknowledged this likelihood by identifying inmates with mental 
illnesses as special candidates for sentence modification.44  Before 
                                                                                                                   
019468 CLASSIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICES 37 (2004), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/sta 
tic.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf. While the thrust of past research and expert commentary 
has concluded that solitary confinement exacts a significant psychological toll on severely ill 
inmates, a recent study found that confinement in administrative segregation does not 
induce significant cognitive or psychological decline in inmates with or without pre-existing 
mental disorders.  See Maureen L. O’Keefe et al., A Longitudinal Study of Administrative 
Segregation, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 49, 54–59 (2013) (“The results of this study 
were inconsistent with the hypothesis that inmates, with or without mental illness, 
experience significant psychological decline in [administrative segregation].”).  More 
research is necessary to determine the extent to which the particular conditions of 
confinement in that study impacted its results.  Id. at 59.  
 42 Johnston, supra note 28, at 177–78 & nn.153–57.  Seriously disordered offenders, 
identified as particularly vulnerable to attack, may also be housed in isolation as a means of 
protection.  Id. at 202.  In protective custody, inmates are often housed in highly restrictive 
conditions that resemble those in disciplinary isolation, with isolation for twenty-one to 
twenty-four hours per day.  Id. at 202–03 & nn.257–58. 
 43 Haney, supra note 10, at 272–73, 281–82. 
 44 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7 cmt. b (“The purposes of sentencing that originally 
supported a sentence of imprisonment may in some instances become inapplicable to . . . a 
prisoner whose physical or mental condition renders it unnecessary, counterproductive, or 
inhumane to continue a term of confinement. . . .  Often, effective treatment is unavailable 
in prison [for the substantial percentage of prisoners who suffer from mental illnesses], 
conditions of the institution may exacerbate the inmate’s condition, and the inmate’s 
impairment may make it impossible to navigate the daily life of the penitentiary.”).  The few 
commentators who have remarked upon the theoretical rationale of proposed Model Penal 
Code Section 305.7 have characterized the measure as allowing a court to correct an unjust, 
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probing trial judges’ abilities to remedy unjust punishment 
through sentence modification, it is necessary to appreciate three 
ways in which an offender’s sentence, as experienced, may become 
unjust.  In particular, his conditions of confinement may render 
his punishment inhumane45 or disproportionate,46 or may infuse it 
with otherwise unjustifiable features.47  These notions of 
unjustness are grounded in moral principles of retributive 
punishment and thus extend beyond the cramped confines of the 
Eighth Amendment as interpreted under current law.48  
1.  Inhumane Punishment.  First, sentence modification may be 
necessary to address inhumane conditions of confinement.49  As a 
theory premised upon respect for the moral dignity and 
personhood of the offender,50 retributivism cannot tolerate 
                                                                                                                   
excessive, unwise, inappropriate, or inhumane sentence.  See Richard F. Frase, Second Look 
Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 196 
(2009) (observing that “advanced age or serious infirmity would justify early release 
if . . . [those conditions made] . . . incarceration . . . much more onerous for such an offender, 
making continued custody disproportionate or even cruel”); Cecelia Klingele, The Early 
Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 455 (2011) (endorsing Section 305.7 for 
permitting the correction of injustices that come to light after the commencement of a 
sentence); Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second Look” 
and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 
U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 861, 869, 871 (2011) (suggesting that early release would be 
appropriate if changed circumstances rendered a sentence “unwise or unjust” and 
identifying, in passing, “mercy” and “compassion” as animating forces of the sentence 
modification provisions).  
 45 See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 48 Johnston, supra note 28, at 212–13 n.314. 
 49 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1047 (1978) (“[I]t appears 
that retributivist systems define dignity coextensively with permissible punishment, with 
the result that all violations of human dignity are inherently excessive.”).  Under a lex 
talionis perspective, however, some would argue that punishments can be proportionate yet 
inhumane.  See Hugo Adam Bedau, Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and 
Ethical Problems, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 17–18 (noting that, 
traditionally, lex talionis punishment, punishment which is modeled after the crime, was 
understood to require corporal and capital punishment).  In this situation, moral principles 
of humane treatment would serve as an external constraint on proportionality. See id. 
 50 See, e.g., BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE 51 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing 
the moral theory of Immanuel Kant and characterizing it as resting “on a model of the 
human as someone whose actions are the result of moral choice”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 224–31 (1973) (outlining Immanuel 
Kant’s theory of punishment with an emphasis on its manifestation of respect for dignity, 
autonomy, rationality, and rights).  
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punishments that violate human dignity,51 fail to recognize the 
personality of offenders,52 or “approximate a system of sheer terror 
in which human beings are treated as animals to be intimidated 
and prodded.”53  However, discerning the point at which a mode of 
punishment or conditions associated with a particular sanction 
cross the line from harsh to inhumane is a difficult contextual 
question that ultimately reflects the sensitivities and values of a 
particular society.54  
 While the meaning of “inhumane” could be tethered to 
understandings of cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment, it need not—and perhaps should not—be so 
limited.55  The objective aspect of the cruel and unusual inquiry 
prohibits conditions that “involve the wanton and unnecessary 
infliction of pain,” are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of 
the crime warranting imprisonment,” or “deprive inmates of the 
                                                                                                                   
 51 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 233 (1979).  See generally 
Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row 
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005) (discussing 
and critiquing the relevance of dignity to retributivism). 
 52 See MURPHY, supra note 51, at 233 (decrying “a punishment which is in itself 
degrading, which treats the prisoner as an animal instead of a human being, which perhaps 
even is an attempt to reduce him to an animal or mere thing” as inconsistent with human 
dignity). 
 53 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 488 (1968); see also Dan 
Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to 
Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 958 (2010) (“To literally or psychologically break 
or destroy a person under the aegis of retributive punishment would violate the offender’s 
dignity, and, in a democracy, our own.”). 
 54 See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123 (1973) (proposing, as an 
alternative to unsuccessful attempts to mathematically equate punishment to crime, that 
punishment limitations be debated and decided based on normative considerations); David 
Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 143 (1991) 
(“Usually the boundary line has the unspoken, barely visible character of something that 
everyone takes for granted.”).  
 55 In addition to relying on the objective prong of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
test, a judge could draw upon more robust conceptions of humane punishment derived from 
human rights norms.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
10(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“All 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person.”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(1)–
(2), Nov. 22, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the 
right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.  No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.  All persons 
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person.”). 
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minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”56  In a case 
involving correctional officials’ failure to prevent harm, an “inmate 
must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”57  Life-threatening conditions 
need not await a tragic event to warrant a remedy.58  These 
notions of intolerable conditions could form the basis of an 
understanding of “inhumane” conditions for purposes of sentence 
modification.  
In the context of Eighth Amendment violations, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has construed the word “punishment” as requiring 
an inmate to prove that a responsible correctional official acted 
with “deliberate indifference” towards the inmate’s health or 
safety by knowing of the existence of conditions that pose a 
substantial risk of serious harm and failing to take reasonable 
measures to abate the risk.59  However, authority to respond to 
inhumane conditions should not require a demonstration of 
subjective awareness on the part of correctional officials.60  
Demonstration of a culpable mens rea should be less necessary in 
the context of sentence modification, where the primary purpose of 
the hearing is not to establish a violation of a civil right but rather 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 
 57 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 58 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33–36 (1993) (finding that an Eighth 
Amendment claim could derive from possible future harm to health from exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke). 
 59 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976) 
(explaining why an accidental or negligent deprivation of necessary medical care would not 
suffice to establish an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 60 Other scholars have criticized the subjective requirement of the Eighth Amendment.  
See, e.g., James J. Park, Redefining Eighth Amendment Punishments: A New Standard for 
Determining the Liability of Prison Officials for Failing to Protect Inmates from Serious 
Harm, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 407, 429 (2001) (criticizing the knowledge requirement and 
proposing a liability standard based on the common law duty of care owed by landowners to 
invitees); Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 167–69 
(2006) (criticizing the focus on the “intent” of complex penal institutions as an incoherent 
parsing of the concept of punishment that simply allows the state to avoid liability); Jason 
D. Sanabria, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth 
Amendment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1113, 1152 (1995) (“[L]ooking into the state of mind of 
prison officials is simply irrelevant in determining if a prisoner has been subjected to cruel 
and unusual punishment.”); Matthew J. Giacobbe, Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth 
Amendment-A Prisoner Must Prove that Prison Officials Acted with Deliberate Indifference 
to Confinement Conditions for Such Conditions to Constitute Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment—Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991), 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 1505, 1528 
(1992) (arguing for an objective approach to appraising cruel and unusual punishment). 
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to respond to an inmate’s present circumstances and, if necessary, 
structure a sentence to better achieve the purposes of 
punishment.61  In a sentence modification hearing, a judge can 
only determine whether the purposes of the sentence are being 
served by examining the inmate’s actual experience of 
punishment, including his current and likely future conditions of 
confinement.  These conditions are part and parcel of the actual, 
lived term of confinement, are now “known” by an agent of the 
state (the judge), and typically will have been caused by the 
state.62  Hence, in this setting, conditions of confinement can 
rightly be considered part of an offender’s punishment for which 
the state should be held responsible.63  If a judge believes that 
those conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm or 
otherwise fail to respect the humanity of the offender, and that 
they are likely to continue, then she should be able to respond to 
the conditions through sentence modification.  Such modification 
would be necessary to restore, safeguard, and advance the 
retributive purposes of punishment, premised on respect for the 
dignity and autonomy of offenders.  
2.  Unjustified Conditions of Confinement.  Second, sentence 
modification could be necessary to address correctional conditions 
that are not justified by the purposes of sentencing.  Inhumane 
conditions would be one example of illegitimate and unjustified 
conditions, but this category extends beyond that example.  If an 
offender’s correctional program or conditions of confinement are 
inconsistent with, or not rationally related to, the purpose of an 
inmate’s sentence,64 the correctional conditions could subvert the 
                                                                                                                   
 61 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7(7) (“The trial court may modify a sentence if the court 
finds that the circumstances of the prisoner’s advanced age, physical or mental infirmity, 
exigent family circumstances, or other conferring reasons, justify a modified sentence in 
light of the purposes of sentencing . . . .”). 
 62 See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 939 (2009) (observing in the context of incarceration that “there will 
likely be few cases in which harm to prisoners is not traceable to official conduct”). 
 63 Cf. id. at 897–908 (arguing that all state-created prison conditions constitute 
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes). 
 64 Cf. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
CORRECTIONS § 5.9 cmt., at 173–74 (1973), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Dig 
itization/10865NCJRS.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N] (“The sentence imposed by 
the court is binding on two parties, the offender and the correctional agency.  The offender 
is required to serve the sentence imposed.  The correctional agency should be required to 
execute the sentence the sentencing court envisioned.”).   
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purpose of the original sentence or render the sentence harsher 
than intended. Indeed, the need to respond to unjustified, harsh 
prison conditions has, in the past, led policy bodies to advocate 
that sentencing courts maintain jurisdiction over prisoners.65  As 
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals has argued, only through a second look or continuing 
jurisdiction mechanism can a sentencing court ensure that “[t]he 
correctional agency [executes] the sentence the sentencing court 
envisioned,” with its implicit “stipulations that the inmate will 
receive decent medical treatment, fair nutrition, and equitable 
handling of his complaints and grievances.”66  
3.  Disproportionate Punishment.  Third, sentence modification 
may be necessary to address disproportionate punishment.  There 
are numerous variants of retributivism,67 but a common tenet 
                                                                                                                   
 65 See infra notes 238–244 and accompanying text. 
 66 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 64, § 5.9 cmt., at 173–74; see also Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Criminal Justice System, Project on Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 408–09 (1977) (advocating that, as a means to ensure that prisoners’ 
sentences are carried out consistently with the purposes and intents of their sentences, 
“[j]udges should not sentence defendants to confinement unless correctional authorities 
have certified in writing that facilities, programs, and personnel are available to reasonably 
carry out the purpose and intent of each sentence”). 
 67 See Mitchell N. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism 1 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 225, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ab 
stract=2117619 (“Even if we limit consideration to those central or paradigmatic forms of 
retributivism that would justify punishment in terms of an offender’s negative desert, 
particular accounts espouse different positions regarding, for example, just what it is that 
offender’s [sic] deserve, in virtue of what [sic] they deserve it, and what justifies the state in 
endeavoring to realize those deserts.”); Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of 
Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 146–47 (Andrei 
Marmor ed., 2012) (discussing various forms of retributivism); John Cottingham, Varieties 
of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238–45 (1979) (delineating nine distinct retributivist 
theories); Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1059–64 (2011) 
(providing a taxonomy of retributive theories).  A traditional variant of retributivism 
theorizes that deserved punishment, justified by the moral culpability and desert of the 
offender, is an intrinsic good.  See Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) 
(distinguishing this pure theory of retribution from theories that use goods beside the 
offender’s desert to justify punishment); G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT 127 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) 
(clarifying that the value of punishment is that the offender deserves it).  Other 
retributivists, however, view punishment as an instrumental good and suggest that it may 
promote crime control or provide pleasure or utility.  See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment 
Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 31–34 (Mark D. White ed., 
2011) (describing punishment as an instrumental good that reduces crime, promotes 
utilitarian character, and “simply feels good”).  For recent scholarship complicating the 
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dictates allocating punishment according to a proportionality 
equation that considers blameworthiness and severity of penalty.68  
Just desert theory,69 for example, holds that the severity of an 
offender’s punishment should reflect the offender’s culpability and 
the harm that he inflicted through his criminal act.70  While many 
scholars measure the severity of a particular method of 
punishment by reference to deprivations as experienced by a 
typical offender,71 some influential commentators have recognized 
that sanctions such as incarceration have a foreseeable, disparate 
impact on vulnerable classes of offenders.72  To achieve 
proportionality and parity, these scholars have argued that it may 
be necessary in extreme cases to adjust ordered sanctions so that 
vulnerable defendants receive penalties of roughly equivalent 
severity as non-vulnerable individuals.73  As argued in prior work, 
                                                                                                                   
dominant understanding of retributivism and challenging the strict divide between 
retributivist and consequentialist theories of punishment, see Mitchell N. Berman, Two 
Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433 (R.A. Duff 
& Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
 68 See Ryan, supra note 67, at 1062–64 (distinguishing between harm-based and intent-
based means of evaluating an offender’s desert and asserting that, “[t]o the extent that 
American sentencing systems are retribution-based, they are often harm-based systems in a 
number of respects”).  
 69 Just desert theory rose to prominence in the late 1970s as a means of curtailing 
sentencing discretion and bounding the state’s coercive power over offenders.  See Frederic 
R. Kellogg, From Retribution to “Desert”: The Evolution of Criminal Punishment, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY 179, 186–87 (1977) (criticizing positivist individualization for “the element of 
disparity in administration” and explaining the new movement’s “enlightened sense of 
fairness”).  Just desert theory was developed and refined within an expressive framework 
by Professor Andrew von Hirsch over the course of four books: DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE 
OF PUNISHMENTS (1976), PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN 
THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985), CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993), and, with Andrew 
Ashworth, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005). 
 70 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: 
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 4 (2005) (“The desert rationale rests on the idea that the penal 
sanction should fairly reflect the degree of reprehensibleness (that is, the harmfulness and 
culpability) of the actor’s conduct.”). 
 71 See, e.g., id. at 41–42 (discussing and rejecting a subjectivist view of penal severity for 
an “interest-analysis” in which “severity is not made dependent on the preferences and 
sensitivities of particular individuals”); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1619, 1658 & n.195 (2010) (“[R]etributivism defines punishment as a restraint on 
liberty or other consequence that is determined and justified objectively by reference to a 
culpable offense.”). 
 72 See infra note 73. 
 73 See, e.g., VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 42–43, 172–73, 176 (suggesting 
that age, serious illness, and disability are factors that may make a punishment 
significantly more onerous for a particular offender and, therefore, under an “equal-impact” 
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this notion—known as the principle of equal impact and further 
detailed in Part III.A.2—implicitly assumes both that the 
punishment calculus should include the foreseeable, deleterious 
effects of incarceration and that these harms are susceptible to 
justification.74 
 Indeed, some jurisdictions authorize judges, in sentencing or 
early release decisions, to consider past or forecasted hardship in 
correctional institutions.  A number of jurisdictions currently treat 
vulnerability to undue hardship in prison or jail—including the 
likely exacerbation of mental disorder, susceptibility to 
victimization, and housing in isolation—as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing.75  In some of these jurisdictions, vulnerability to harm 
                                                                                                                   
principle, justify modification); Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal 
Treatment, and the Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 251, 254–61, 271 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin 
Wasik eds., 1998) (“[F]airness requires a recognition that the same sentence may have a 
disproportionately severe impact on certain offenders.”); see also Adam J. Kolber, The 
Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 199–210 (2009) (“[A] 
justification of punishment must recognize that punishment experience matters.”).  
 74 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 191–207 (arguing that foreseeable, substantial risks of 
serious harm to offenders with major mental disorders should factor into sentencing 
decisions in order to avoid imposing disproportionate or inhumane punishment).  The 
relationship of unintended hardship to just punishment is a matter of fierce debate.  Id. at 
184–85, 188–91.  Traditionally, scholars have defined punishment as including only 
hardships or deprivations intended and authorized by a legitimate sentencing authority.  
See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 103, 111–12 (2001) (defining punishment as suffering inflicted by a recognized legal 
authority after due process); Johnston, supra note 28, at 188–89 nn.197–98 (collecting 
sources).  The understanding of the equal impact theory expressed in this Article relies 
upon a broader conception of punishment that includes significant and foreseeable 
hardships proximately caused by the state.  See id. at 186–88.  
 75 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (2014) (directing trial courts to “accord[ ] 
weight in favor of suspension or probation” to whether “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant 
would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or to a dependent of the defendant”); D.C. 
SENTENCING & CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2014) (allowing a judge to sentence outside the voluntary sentencing 
guidelines when “the court determines that the defendant, by reason of obvious and 
substantial mental or physical impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately protected or 
treated in any available prison facility”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-621(2)(i) (2014) (“The court, 
in determining whether to impose a term of probation, shall consider [whether] . . . [t]he 
imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the 
defendant’s dependents.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 5-5-3.1(a)(12) (2013) (providing that a 
sentencing judge should consider, as a factor in favor of withholding or minimizing a 
sentence of imprisonment, whether “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would endanger 
his or her medical condition”); IND. CODE 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (2014) (authorizing a court to 
consider when a person’s imprisonment will result in undue hardship to her or her 
dependents as a factor favoring suspension of the sentence and imposition of probation); LA. 
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may result in a reduced prison sentence.76  Few published sentence 
modification orders exist,77 but appellate opinions demonstrate 
that prisoners’ mental illnesses have affected courts’ evaluations of 
the severity of their sentences and have justified sentence 
                                                                                                                   
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1.B(31) (2014) (providing that courts, when deciding 
whether to suspend a sentence and impose probation, should consider whether “[t]he 
imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his 
dependents”); MONT. CODE ANN. 46-18-225(2)(j) (2014) (“Prior to sentencing a nonviolent 
felony offender . . . to a term of imprisonment in a state prison, the sentencing judge shall 
take into account whether: . . . imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive 
hardship on the offender or the offender’s family.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 
2014) (authorizing the court to consider the mitigating factor of whether “the imprisonment 
of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents” when 
determining an appropriate sentence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(11) (2013) (directing 
that whether “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail undue hardship to himself 
or his dependents” “shall be accorded weight in making determinations regarding the 
desirability of sentencing an offender to imprisonment”); UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 
ADULT SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES 14–15, available at http://www.sentencing. 
state.ut.us/Guidelines/Adult/2013%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Release%20Guidelin
es.final.combined.pdf (identifying whether “[i]mprisonment would entail excessive hardship 
on offender or dependents” as a mitigating circumstance that may justify departure from 
the guidelines); see also HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIMINAL 
LAW & PROCEDURE § 36:41(F) (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that, under the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines as interpreted through case law, a judge is required to consider a 
dispositional departure at sentencing if the defendant meets the mitigating factor of being 
vulnerable to victimization in a prison setting); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective 
Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1119–20 & n.284 (2009) (characterizing 
whether imprisonment would constitute a hardship for the offender as a mitigating factor 
that has been considered “particularly powerful in various jurisdictions” and listing some 
jurisdictions); cf. Johnston, supra note 38, at 655 nn.195–97 (listing and describing over a 
dozen statutes that classify an offender’s need for treatment as a valid consideration at 
sentencing); id. at 650 n.170 (listing and describing key features of statues allowing judges 
to commit defendants for mental health treatment in lieu of incarceration).  
 76 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 656.  For a theoretical defense of such discounts, see 
Johnston, supra note 28, at 200–07, 221–26.  Some commentators have argued that this 
practice is problematic in its effect of sanctioning harsher treatment.  See infra notes 196–
197 and accompanying text.  Of course, reducing a sentence on the basis of harsher 
anticipated conditions of confinement is only morally acceptable if legitimate aims of 
punishment justify the foreseeable hardship.  See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying 
text.  
 77 See Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial 
Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 
502, 508 (2010) (noting that decisions under sentencing modification statutes are not widely 
reported); see also Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 26, at 45 (remarking upon the difficulty 
of obtaining an accurate picture of the use of sentence reduction “due to inadequate record 
keeping at the county level” and urging judges to transmit, and counties to maintain, a 
record of each use of the sentence modification power). 
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reductions.78  Courts have reduced sentences based on abuse, such 
as sexual assault, that occurred during confinement.79  Finally, 
compassionate release decisions may also partially reflect the view 
that the continued incarceration of certain elderly, terminally ill, 
or infirm inmates, in light of their hardship in prison, exceeds the 
punishment merited by the seriousness of their offenses.80  
III.  SENTENCE MODIFICATION AS A RESPONSE TO UNJUST 
PUNISHMENT 
Judicial sentence modification offers an attractive means to 
respond to unjust punishment as well as economic and social 
benefits.81  In the past, jurisdictions relied on parole and executive 
clemency to release prisoners for whom incarceration was no 
                                                                                                                   
 78 See, e.g., People v. Walsh, 957 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (stressing the 
appellate court’s “broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe 
under the circumstances, even though the sentence may be within the permissible statutory 
range,” and ability to “reduce a sentence in the interests of justice, taking into account 
factors such as a defendant’s age, physical and mental health, and remorse,” and reducing 
the length of the defendant’s sentence of incarceration by half, based in part on the 
offender’s age and poor health (quoting People v. Delgado, 599 N.E.2d 675 (1992) (citing 
People v. Ehrlich, 574 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1991)))); People v. Mortimore, 466 N.Y.S.2d 491, 491 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (reversing the sentencing, remitting for resentencing, ordering an 
updated presentence report and a hearing “for the purpose of receiving testimony 
concerning the physical condition and medical history of defendant, and concerning the 
adequacy of treatment and care available at the jail,” and indicating concern as to “whether 
defendant’s physical condition is such that a sentence of imprisonment . . . is apt to affect 
his health”); People v. Randolphe, 494 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding 
similarly); see also State v. Bradley, Nos. CR06139814S, CR06139635S, MV06309377S, 
2008 WL 282746, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2008) (“[T]he fact that [the defendant] 
suffers from a painful medical condition, which has deteriorated during his incarceration, is 
a factor that the court nonetheless considers.”).  
 79 See Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1575, 1628 & nn.229–31 (2012) (listing cases in which courts reduced or 
considered reducing sentences for abusive conditions of confinement, extremely restrictive 
conditions of confinement, and occurrences of sexual assault while awaiting sentencing).  
 80 See Johnston, supra note 12, at 67 n.104 (citing commentators who have maintained 
that compassionate release can be consistent with the purposes of sentencing, including 
retribution); id. at 81–82 & nn.175–81 (exploring when compassionate release may be 
consistent with concerns of proportionality).  Legislatures typically entrust compassionate 
release decisions to executive decisionmakers such as parole boards, not to judges.  See TD-
2, supra note 18, § 305.7 reporter’s note c (recognizing that a majority of states grant ability 
to modify sentences to nonjudicial officials); Klingele, supra note 77, at 492–94 (discussing 
compassionate release for elderly and seriously ill inmates through parole boards). 
 81 See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text; Part III.A.2.a. 
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longer warranted.82  Recent studies, however, document that 
states’ use of those mechanisms has been in steep decline.83  
Scholars have attributed the ebbing of parole, in particular, to 
doubts about the legitimacy and validity of this mode of decision-
making.  Professor Cecelia Klingele has summarized the problems 
with parole in this way:  
Unlike sentencing decisions made in open court, 
release decisions in the indeterminate system were 
made privately, always outside public view, often 
without input from victims or other interested parties, 
and ordinarily without explanation.  Statewide parole 
boards were typically composed of political appointees 
who often lacked knowledge about the local conditions 
to which offenders would return upon release.  
Moreover, board members acted with nearly 
unfettered discretion: their decisions were usually 
unreviewable and were often made in reliance on 
institutional factors that bore only a tenuous 
connection to public safety.84   
                                                                                                                   
 82 See Johnston, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that Section 305.7’s allocation of 
decisionmaking authority to judges distinguishes it from traditional compassionate release 
measures, which rely on parole boards and executive clemency). 
 83 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 
FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 153–54 (2009) (noting that the number of clemency requests and 
pardons granted has dropped in recent decades); Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the 
Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 751, 772 (2013) (“[T]he actual use of executive clemency has steadily decreased from 
1972 to the present day.”); ALLISON LAWRENCE & DONNA LYONS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATORS, PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTION 
POLICY:  A REPORT OF THE NCSL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS WORK GROUP 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.ncls.org/documents/cj/pew/WGprinciplesreport.pdf (“With the rise of 
determinate and sentencing guidelines systems and the adoption of truth-in-sentencing 
provisions in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of states restricted or eliminated discretionary 
parole.  Although parole boards still exist in most states, their function often has 
changed.”).  Recently, however, states have begun increasing their use of parole as a means 
to relieve over-congestion of prisons.  See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CONTINUING FISCAL 
CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: SETTING A NEW COURSE 4, 17–19 (2010), available at http://www. 
vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/The-continuing-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections-1 
0-2010-updated.pdf (discussing expansions in parole eligibility as a method of reducing 
prison populations).  
 84 Klingele, supra note 77, at 474–75. 
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Observing this decline, commentators have made the case for 
greater use of judicial sentence modification.85  They have argued 
that the back-end modification of sentences constitutes an exercise 
of sentencing power that should properly reside with the 
judiciary.86  In addition, judicial decisions, delivered in open court 
and accompanied by statements of reasons,87 will be more 
transparent and legitimate than those of prison administrators or 
parole boards.88  Offering inmates the opportunity to file motions 
for sentence modification would allow judges to respond to 
changed offender circumstances and, if relevant to a jurisdiction’s 
purposes of sentencing, to benefit from improved risk-assessment 
methods and rehabilitative programming.89  Releasing inmates for 
whom incarceration is no longer deserved or appropriate would 
carry societal benefits beyond freeing up precious correctional 
space and funding.90  Relief of prison overcrowding could result in 
the filing of fewer suits alleging violations of civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, higher levels of inmate productivity, and lower 
levels of inmate victimization and unrest.91  
                                                                                                                   
 85 See, e.g., id. at 498–521 (discussing the advantages of judicial sentence modification 
over other mechanisms); Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 26, at 43–45 (arguing against 
attempts to restrict judicial sentence modification in Maryland); TD-2, supra note 18, 
§ 305.6 & cmts. (suggesting giving judicial officials the power to modify sentences). 
 86 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6 cmt. d (“[T]he code firmly recommends that the 
sentence-modification authority should be viewed as a judicial function.”); see also TD-1, 
supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(b)(i) & cmt. h (listing the preservation of judicial discretion as a 
general purpose of the Model Code revisions).  
 87 Klingele, supra note 77, at 515 (noting that the transparency of judicial sentence 
modifications is advantageous).  
 88 See id. at 470, 495, 515–21 (discussing how the transparency and legitimacy of judicial 
sentence modification makes the mechanism sustainable). 
 89 TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6 cmt. b.  A judge could also potentially reassess the 
proportionality of an offender’s punishment in light of evolving sensibilities about the 
gravity of his offense or his blameworthiness.  Id. 
 90 Conditional release is considerably less expensive than incarceration.  See Amy 
Robinson-Oost, Evaluation as the Proper Function of the Parole Board: An Analysis of New 
York State’s Proposed SAFE Parole Act, 16 CUNY L. REV. 129, 134 (2012) (“In fiscal year 
2010, the average cost of incarceration for federal inmates was $28,284.  In stark contrast, 
the average cost of community-based supervision, through parole or probation, is 
approximately one-tenth of that amount; probation costs approximately $1,250 per person 
annually, while parole costs $2,750.”); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG 
REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.convictcriminology. 
org/pdf/pew/onein31.pdf (“[T]he daily cost of supervising a probationer in fiscal 2008 was 
$3.42; the average daily cost of a prison inmate, $78.95, is more than 20 times as high.”).  
 91 See supra note 10 (discussing how prison overcrowding results in increased violence 
and idleness, and limited access to rehabilitative services). 
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Nevertheless, the conversation around expanding the use of 
judicial sentence modification has thus far neglected to probe its 
potential for correcting unjust sentences.  Commentators have 
identified the correction of unjust punishment as an important aim 
of sentence modification and have assumed that sentence 
modification would be effective in achieving that goal.92  This Part 
scrutinizes that assumption and assesses the capacity of three 
common sentence modification options—immediate release, a 
shortened term of confinement with future release, and parole or 
another form of conditional release—to address various forms of 
unjustness.  Examining when these remedies will be appropriate 
provides one means of illuminating a possible gap in remedial 
coverage.  The analysis reveals that sentence modification, as 
currently conceived, will fail to address the unjust punishment 
experienced by some disordered prisoners, both in jurisdictions in 
which desert plays a defining or guiding function in allocating 
punishment and where its role is more limited.93  
A.  IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
The remedy of immediate release, or at least a transfer to non-
punitive civil confinement for treatment,94 would be an 
                                                                                                                   
 92 See supra note 44 (discussing the rationales scholars propose for sentence modification); 
Johnston, supra note 12, at 79–81 nn.170–74 (noting commentators who articulate the 
purpose of sentence modification as ensuring that the sentence is just). 
 93 Theoretically, desert or blameworthiness could be a “defining” principle of punishment 
that specifies the “precisely appropriate” punishment, a “guiding” principle to be respected 
“unless other values . . . justify its rejection,” or a “limiting” principle that, “though it would 
rarely tell us the exact sanction to be imposed, . . . would nevertheless give us the outer 
limits of leniency and severity which should not be exceeded.”  Norval Morris, Punishment, 
Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257, 259 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch 
eds., 1981); see Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1301–03 (2006) (explaining Morris’s view of desert as neither a defining 
nor a guiding principle, but a limiting one). 
 94 See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 27–28 (1986) (“[I]t is at least arguable that 
someone who is so disordered that he is not fit to be punished should . . . be subject only to 
the ordinary non-criminal provisions for ‘compulsory admission’ to hospital.”).  States 
typically permit the involuntary civil confinement of individuals whose mental disorders 
render them a significant danger to themselves or others.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) 
(2014) (authorizing involuntary inpatient treatment when, because of an individual’s 
mental illness, “[t]here is substantial likelihood that in the near future . . . he will inflict 
serious bodily harm on . . . himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior 
causing, attempting, or threatening such harm”); W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Strategies for Improving 
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appropriate response to unjust punishment in at least two 
situations. First, a court should release an inmate if his cognitive 
limitations render him an unfit subject for punishment.  Second, 
release would be appropriate if the severity of the offender’s 
punishment, considering his conditions of confinement, exceeds 
that warranted by his offense.95  This section explores the 
justifications for immediate release within a retributive 
framework and their existing support under the law.96  
1.  Unfit Subject for Retributive Punishment.  Communicative 
accounts of retributive punishment hold that an offender must be 
capable of understanding why he is being punished in order for the 
state to proceed with punishment.97  Professors Dan Markel and 
Chad Flanders have argued that an offender “must be a fit 
interlocutor for the communicative message of retributive 
punishment” throughout the life cycle of the punishment process.98  
As they explain it, “the value of retribution lies in the criminal’s 
ability to understand rationally the state’s desire to repudiate his 
wrongful claim to be above the law.”99  If an individual is so 
mentally impaired that he cannot understand that he is being 
punished for his criminal act, “then the punishment is not 
retributive but merely a coercive deprivation whose condemnatory 
                                                                                                                   
Treatment and Reducing Recidivism, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 24–45 (2007) 
(describing coercive mental health treatment measures for persons with mental disorders 
who are released from prison).  In addition, a handful of jurisdictions authorize a trial 
judge, prior to sentencing, to commit a defendant for mental health treatment, in lieu of 
incarceration, when certain criteria are satisfied.  See Johnston, supra note 38, at 649–54 
(exploring the relevant federal statute and listing state analogues). 
 95 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing how to factor unintended hardships into the cost of 
punishment). 
 96 See supra note 30 (noting that this paper does not subscribe to a particular version of 
retributivism).  Of course, a thoroughgoing utilitarian might embrace these sentence 
modification approaches in order to ensure the optimization of outcomes and expenditures. 
 97 See infra Part III.A.1.  In addition to Professors Robert Nozick, Dan Markel, and Chad 
Flanders, all discussed in this section, Professor Antony Duff has theorized on the 
importance of an offender’s ability to understand the meaning of his punishment.  See, e.g., 
DUFF, supra note 94, at 27 (“[W]hat is crucial here (apart from considerations of past 
deserts or of future consequences) is the offender’s capacity to understand and respond to 
her imprisonment as a punishment: if she is now so disordered that she lacks this capacity 
she is not fit to be punished . . . . For punishment aims, and must aim, if it is to be properly 
justified, to address the offender as a rational and responsible agent: if she cannot 
understand what is being done to her, or why it is being done, or how it is related as a 
punishment to her past offence, her punishment becomes a travesty.”). 
 98 Markel & Flanders, supra note 53, at 910. 
 99 Id. at 933. 
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character is lost on the offender.”100  Similarly, Professor Robert 
Nozick has observed that, when an offender becomes so mentally 
defective “so as to be incapable of learning or realizing that his act 
was wrong,” the individual becomes an unsuitable object of 
retributive punishment because he is “incapable of being 
connected (at least by the act of punishment) to correct values qua 
correct values.”101  To continue to punish an individual in such 
circumstances would simply be “a harmful act” by the state.102  
Relatedly, at least two sets of commentators have referenced the 
importance of inmates’ competence to be punished for 
compassionate release laws.103 
Two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court indicate the Court’s 
possible subscription to the principle that an offender who is 
incapable of rationally understanding the purpose and meaning of 
his punishment is an unsuitable subject for retributive 
punishment.  In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an “insane” prisoner 
in part because his execution would serve no retributive value.104  
Moreover, in Panetti v. Quarterman, the Court construed Ford to 
hold that an inmate may be “insane,” and thus unfit for execution, 
when his severe delusions prevent him from possessing a rational 
understanding of his punishment.105  Quoting the plurality and 
concurring opinions in Ford, the Court reasoned that offenders 
must have the ability to “comprehend[ ] the reasons for the penalty 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id.  In this circumstance, an individual is probably a good candidate for non-punitive 
treatment.  Id. at 953 & n.172.  The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards require that a person who is “incompetent at time of sentence” receive 
appropriate treatment or habitation and, if restored, be allowed to allocute.  See AM. BAR 
ASS’N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 269 (1989), available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_me
ntalhealth_blk.html#7-9.8.  
 101 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 372, 385 (1981). 
 102 Id. at 372. 
 103 See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1466 & n.135 (2004) (arguing 
that, as long as offenders are competent, leniency undermines retributivism’s goal to impose 
just deserts); Brie A. Williams et al., Balancing Punishment and Compassion for Seriously Ill 
Prisoners, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 122, 123 (2011), available at http://annals.org/article.a 
spx?articleId=747043 (stating that the justification for incarceration may be undermined by a 
change in the inmate’s competency). 
 104 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986).  The Court failed to elucidate the meaning of “insane,” 
however, and instead left this determination to the states.  Id. at 416. 
 105 551 U.S. 930, 958–62 (2007). 
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[and] its implications”106 and to be aware “of the punishment they 
are about to suffer and why they are about to suffer it.”107  
Delusions, the Court held, may undermine this “ ‘comprehension’ 
or ‘awaren[ess]’ if they so impair the prisoner’s concept of reality 
that he cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the 
execution.”108  The Court observed:  
The potential for a prisoner’s recognition of the 
severity of the offense . . . [is] called in question . . . if 
the prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental 
illness that his awareness of the crime and 
punishment has little or no relation to the 
understanding of those concepts shared by the 
community as a whole.109  
Professor Markel has argued that the rationale of Panetti and 
its requirement of mental competence should extend beyond the 
context of the death penalty to continued confinement in prison.110  
To date, however, it appears that no court has applied Panetti 
outside the confines of capital punishment to release or transfer a 
mentally disordered, incompetent prisoner.111  
In addition, to the extent that the state “breaks” an offender 
through an egregious failure to provide basic necessities or 
humane conditions, the state may forfeit its right to punish that 
individual.112  Professors Markel and Flanders have argued: 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 957 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (plurality opinion)). 
 107 Id. (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 108 Id. at 958. 
 109 Id. at 958–59.  The Court indicated that mere unrepentance, callousness, “misanthropic 
personality,” or “amoral character” will not suffice to meet this standard; rather a “psychotic 
disorder” will be required as a threshold matter.  Id. at 959–60. 
 110 See Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth 
Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1216–18 (2009) (“[T]here is no plausible basis for 
suggesting that someone who is mentally impaired enough to be spared execution should 
not also be spared from spending the rest of his life in a cage.  The severity of the 
punishment is not the problem; it’s the fact of punishment.”). 
 111 At least one court has applied the Panetti standard of competence outside the context 
of capital sentencing, however.  See United States v. Wolfson, 616 F. Supp. 2d 398, 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The principles that the Court explained in Panetti spring from the Court’s 
interpretation of ‘rational understanding’ as applied to an execution for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment. The same requirement of ‘rational understanding’ applies to the 
determination of competence [for a non-capital sentencing] under the due process clause.”).  
 112 Markel & Flanders, supra note 53, at 961 n.193. 
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[I]f the state’s . . . failure to discharge its carceral or 
punitive obligations in a humane and safe manner . . . 
led to the ‘breaking’ of the offender, . . . the state [may 
have] an obligation to try to repair or restore the 
offender to some normatively acceptable baseline 
condition before it can proceed with the initially 
intended and authorized justified punishment. . . .  
Indeed, we could imagine egregious and irreparable 
situations of ‘breaking’ an offender such that if the 
state did so, it loses its warrant to permissibly 
continue punishing that person.113  
Similarly, Professor Alexander Reinert has observed that, “[i]f 
state-created conditions . . . are ‘punishment,’ then we should be 
willing to entertain the thought that some discrete forms of 
punishment are so horrific that they exhaust the State’s authority 
or capacity to punish.”114  This concept of the state’s “breaking” an 
offender through horrific acts or conditions suggests that 
inhumane conditions and a loss of competence could combine to 
form a particularly forceful rationale for immediate release. 
2.  Factoring Unintended Hardship into the Cost of Punishment.  
An additional justification for immediate release could involve a 
finding that the severity of an offender’s punishment is 
disproportionate to his blameworthiness or the harm brought 
about by his criminal offense.115 Depending on the variant of 
retributivist or mixed retributive/utilitarian theory that animates 
a jurisdiction’s sentencing scheme, a judge could reach such a 
finding through a retributive equal impact analysis or a utilitarian 
ends-benefits evaluation.116  These analyses differ in the inputs 
involved as described below. 
  a.  Equal Impact Analysis.  Under the equal impact theory, 
developed by Professors Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth, and 
others,117 a carceral punishment could become disproportionate 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 114 Reinert, supra note 79, at 1603. 
 115 See Ryan, supra note 67, at 1062–64 (noting that, in American sentencing systems, the 
severity of an offender’s punishment is typically based on the harm he caused). 
 116 See infra Part III.A.2.a–b. 
 117 See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 172–73 (defining the equal impact 
theory); Ashworth & Player, supra note 73, at 252–53 (arguing for an equal treatment 
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when an offender develops a vulnerability to hardship—such as one 
stemming from serious mental disorder, advanced age, or physical 
infirmity—that would greatly increase the onerousness of 
incarceration.118  In such circumstances, prison would hold a much 
greater “punitive bite”119 for the vulnerable inmate than for equally 
blameworthy, non-vulnerable offenders.  Sentence modification may 
then become necessary to avoid the vulnerable prisoner’s 
experiencing a disproportionately severe and inequitable 
punishment.120  The equal impact theory applies to objective 
harm121 and may extend only to certain types of morally relevant 
vulnerability, such as that stemming from involuntarily assumed 
                                                                                                                   
theory of punishment).  The roots of the equal impact theory can be traced to Jeremy 
Bentham.  See Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE Principles of Morals and 
Legislation 182 (Hafner Press 1948) (1789) (proposing that, because the same punishment 
for two different persons might not produce the same effect, “the several circumstances 
influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account”). 
 118 A necessary assumption of this view is that punishment extends beyond intended 
deprivations or hardships.  See supra note 74. 
 119 See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 41–42 (defining “punitive bite” as “the 
extent to which those sanctions interfere with important interests that people have”). 
 120 See id. at 172 (describing the “equal-impact” principle); see also Ashworth & Player, 
supra note 73, at 253 (advocating “a general principle of equal treatment, by which we 
mean that a sentencing system should strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal 
impact on different offenders or groups of offenders”); cf. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, 
PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 11 (1989) (asserting that 
adjustments to sentences may be appropriate on retributivist grounds “to relieve the 
punishment of an offender who has suffered enough, or one whose particular circumstances 
would make him suffer more than he deserves; or[ ] to prevent an unwarranted cruel 
punishment”). 
 121 See Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, The Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in 
Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278, 290–91 (2007) (reviewing 
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70) (“[W]here one offender will objectively suffer more 
from a particular punishment than would another—as, say, a disabled offender will suffer 
quantifiably more from life in prison than will a physically able offender—it would be unfair 
to impose the formally identical sentence on both.”).  Some sources of harm referenced in 
this paper, such as sexual and physical victimization, are clearly objective in nature.  
Others, however, such as the exacerbation or onset of serious mental illnesses, may be 
harder to clearly characterize as objective or subjective harms.  While mental health 
professionals can detect mental disorder through clinical assessment, that assessment 
involves an evaluation of an inmate’s internal feelings, perceptions, and patterns of 
thinking, in addition to his manifested behavior.  See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH 
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 2 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/conent/ 
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (describing that an assessment of inmates for symptoms of mental 
disorders includes questioning the inmates about their feelings and thoughts). 
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sources.122  As referenced previously, a number of jurisdictions 
appear to have employed an equal impact-type analysis in order to 
equalize the severity of punishments experienced by equally 
culpable vulnerable and non-vulnerable offenders.123  
An example might prove useful to illustrate how the equal 
impact principle could operate in the context of sentence 
modification.  Assume that an offender with bipolar disorder with 
psychotic features receives an original sentence of fifteen years in 
prison for his crime of armed robbery.  Assume further that the 
judge imposes this sentence, at the top of the approved statutory 
range, in light of the offender’s high degree of culpability.  Assume 
that the judge does not factor into the severity of his sentence any 
foreseeable hardship related to the inmate’s recognized mental 
illness.124  Furthermore, assume that medication poorly controls 
the inmate’s mental disorder in prison, and that correctional 
officials respond to his symptomatic behavior by identifying the 
inmate as particularly dangerous and placing him in 
administrative segregation. The conditions in his housing unit 
aggravate his disorder, resulting in psychotic delirium, 
hallucinatory confusion, disorientation, and intense agitation and 
paranoia.125  After ten years in isolation, the prisoner moves for 
sentence modification.126  
Upon the kind of resentencing contemplated in this Article, a 
judge could factor the inmate’s harsh and injurious experience in 
prison into the retributive punishment equation and, employing an 
                                                                                                                   
 122 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 194 & n.221 (drawing upon the work of Professor Uma 
Narayan to suggest the moral defensibility of limiting sentencing accommodations for 
foreseeable harm to certain vulnerabilities). 
 123 See supra notes 75–76, 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 124 See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text (discussing sentence mitigation on the 
basis of anticipated vulnerability to harm or undue hardship). 
 125 Assume that, when the inmate reaches a state of crisis, prison authorities remove the 
prisoner from segregation and transfer him to an acute crisis unit for inpatient mental 
health services.  Upon stabilization, authorities return the inmate to segregation, where his 
deterioration begins anew.  See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and 
Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 404 (2006) (noting this cycle); Sally J. 
MacKain & Charles E. Messer, Ending the Inmate Shuffle: An Intermediate Care Program 
for Inmates with a Chronic Mental Illness, 4 J. FORENSIC PYSCHOL. PRAC. 87, 88 (2004) 
(calling this cycle a “revolving door” that traps inmates with mental illness in a downward 
spiral of nonrecovery).  
 126 See infra note 128 (noting that most jurisdictions would not currently entertain this 
kind of motion). 
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equal impact analysis,127 decide that the ten years that the inmate 
served in isolation roughly equate to (or, perhaps, more than 
compensate for) fifteen years of incarceration experienced by a 
non-ill prisoner in the general population.128  In essence, the judge 
would be treating the collateral effects of incarceration, 
proximately caused by the state, as units of punishment when 
assessing whether an offender has reached the quantum of 
punishment merited by his criminal act.129  
                                                                                                                   
 127 See supra notes 73–74, 117–123 and accompanying text.  
 128 Most jurisdictions grant judges only limited resentencing or sentence modification 
authority.  See Klingele, supra note 77, at 498–509 (exploring the history and modern 
practice of judicial sentence modification, including the inherent authority approach of 
Wisconsin).  A jurisdiction that adopts proposed MPC § 305.7 would greatly expand judges’ 
authority to modify sentences, however, and could allow an equal impact analysis of the sort 
imagined here.  See Johnston, supra note 12, at 89 & n.214 (articulating how an offender’s 
vulnerability to harm could factor into the assessment of punishment severity).   This 
analysis assumes that a judge could identify or, for purposes of this comparative inquiry, 
credibly hypothesize, the “typical” legitimate conditions experienced by a “typical” non-ill 
inmate in the general population at some security level.  See infra note 137. 
  Moreover, the test and remedies outlined here would differ markedly from those 
available under the Eighth Amendment.  First, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation 
for harsh conditions of confinement, an inmate must demonstrate that the responsible 
prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” towards his health or safety by knowing 
of the existence of conditions that pose “a substantial risk of serious harm” and failing to 
take reasonable measures to abate the risk.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 838–42 
(1999).  Second, available remedies for past violations of the Eighth Amendment, which are 
typically litigated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, include only injunctive relief and monetary 
damages.  See Reinert, supra note 79, at 1601–02 & n.116 (noting the limitations on a 
court’s authority to release a prisoner).  Third, while early release is a possible remedy for 
ongoing violations, prisoner plaintiffs must first satisfy the requirements of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, and prison authorities must have been afforded ample opportunity to 
correct violations.  See id. at 1600–01.  In addition, in rare instances, habeas relief may be 
available to inmates experiencing horrendous conditions of confinement.  See, e.g., Fox v. 
Zenon, 806 P.2d 166, 168 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a prisoner with alleged mental 
illness who attempted suicide multiple times and was denied psychiatric treatment despite 
numerous requests stated a claim for habeas relief); Schafer v. Maass, 858 P.2d 474, 477 
(Or. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the denial of habeas relief to a prisoner alleging “ongoing and 
periodical assaults”); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 444–45 (6th Cir. 1944) (reversing the 
denial of habeas relief to a prisoner alleging that he suffered “bodily harm and injuries” and 
that he was “subjected to assaults, cruelties and indignities from guards” and other 
inmates).  But see, e.g., Rodney v. Romano, 814 F. Supp. 311, 312–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(holding that a pretrial detainee must seek relief for inadequate medical treatment under 
§ 1983, not by a writ of habeas corpus). 
 129 Admittedly, treating unintended, but foreseeable, side effects of incarceration as 
punishment is a controversial practice that contradicts traditional understandings of 
punishment. See supra note 74. 
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To date, discussions of the equal impact principle have 
primarily taken place in the context of original sentencing.130  For 
instance, scholars have applied this theory to conclude that 
reduced terms of incarceration would be appropriate to effectuate 
proportionate punishment for mentally ill individuals,131 the 
physically disabled,132 and the elderly.133  A key concern during 
original sentencing is how to account, if at all, for foreseeable harm 
to vulnerable defendants.134  Judges could apply the equal impact 
principle more cleanly, however, in the context of resentencing.  At 
the resentencing stage, judges could rely on a record of the 
individual’s experience in prison, the conditions in which he has 
been confined, and the medical or mental health care that he has 
received, rather than merely attempt to forecast possible harm.  A 
prisoner could establish, for example, his previous term of 
confinement in isolation, his declining mental health, his unmet 
need for mental health treatment, and any victimization by staff 
or inmates.  While these conditions may establish grounds for an 
Eighth Amendment violation in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983,135 they might also provide a basis for resentencing, to the 
extent that they made an inmate’s carceral punishment cognizably 
                                                                                                                   
 130 See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 172 (discussing the equal impact 
principle as part of a proportionalist sentencing model); ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING 
AND PENAL POLICY 277 (1983) (arguing that the original sentence should strive for equal 
impact); Johnston, supra note 28, at 194 n.219, 221–28 (advocating for sentencing 
accommodation for substantial risks of serious harm to a particular offender); see also 
Kolber, supra note 73, at 199–210 (arguing that an offender’s subjective experience of a 
punishment should be accounted for when assessing proportionality).  
 131 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 100 (5th ed. 2010) 
(suggesting that sentencing may be adjusted for offenders who have a “special mental or 
medical condition”); VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 173 (describing how the 
equal impact principle would work for “old, ill, or disabled defendants”); Ashworth & Player, 
supra note 73, at 255 (arguing that the equal impact principle can minimize 
disproportionate impact on certain offenders, e.g., the “mentally disordered”); Johnston, 
supra note 28, at 194 n.219, 221–28 (advocating this position). 
 132 See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 70, at 172 (applying the equal impact 
principle to a “disabled, wheelchair-bound offender” and concluding that the penalty should 
be “scaled down”). 
 133 See id. at 176 (arguing that, logically, the equal impact argument “hold[s]” in “cases 
where the offender is seriously affected by advanced age”); Ashworth & Player, supra note 
73, at 260 (arguing that, under the equal impact theory, elderly offenders should have their 
sentences reduced to take account of their shorter life expectancy). 
 134 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 199–200 n.242 (discussing the prudential concerns 
regarding the administration of sentences based on future harms). 
 135 See supra note 128. 
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harsher than terms of the same length experienced by typical, 
hypothetical, less vulnerable inmates.136  If, considering his 
conditions of confinement, an offender has already experienced his 
maximum deserved quantum of punishment, then his continued 
confinement would be unjust.137 
  b.  Ends-benefits Proportionality.  In a jurisdiction employing 
the sentencing theory of limiting retributivism,138 immediate 
release could be appropriate when a punishment violates 
utilitarian notions of proportionality, even when it does not exceed 
the maximum deserved penalty.139  Under this theory, desert and 
moral blameworthiness serve as a limiting principle, “a principle 
that, though it would rarely tell us the exact sanction to be 
imposed . . . would nevertheless give us the outer limits of leniency 
and severity which should not be exceeded.”140  Within the range of 
deserved penalties, a sentencing court may pursue utilitarian 
                                                                                                                   
 136 The norm to be used in an equal impact analysis is difficult to identify and defend.  A 
sizeable minority of prisoners, for instance, will have recognized vulnerabilities to harm, 
including mental or physical impairments, young age, first-offender status, or gay or bisexual 
orientation.  See, e.g., LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 221740, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS (2008), available at http://www.bjs. 
gov/content/pub/pdf/mpp.pdf (“More than a third (36%) of state inmates and nearly a quarter 
(24%) of federal inmates reported having an impairment.”); Statistics: Average Inmate Age, 
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inma 
te_age.jsp (reporting that, as of Sept. 30, 2014, there were 2,905 inmates age twenty-one or 
younger in federal prisons); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1 (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publication 
s/sl_fedprisonpopulation.pdf (“One-third [of the federal prison population] (34.4%) are first-
time, non-violent offenders.”); NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., POLICY REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT 
GUIDE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX PERSONS IN CUSTODIAL 
SETTINGS 6 (2013), available at http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
lgbtipolicyguideaugust2013.pdf (citing a 2008 government study finding that 8% of surveyed 
prisoners identified as a sexuality other than heterosexual).  Correctional officials should 
confine all vulnerable inmates in a way that, to the extent possible, protects them from the 
collateral harmful effects of punishment.  
 137 Cf. Reinert, supra note 79, at 1625 (arguing, in the context of the Eighth Amendment, 
“[i]f one believes that an abusive condition, in addition to the time already spent in prison, 
has imposed a total punishment that is disproportionate to an offender’s crime of conviction, 
then the remedy of release is necessary not only to remedy the prior imposition of the 
abusive condition but also to prevent any further punishment.  Additional punishment 
beyond that which is already disproportionate would quite clearly constitute a distinct 
constitutional injury that can be most directly remedied by release.”). 
 138 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the Model Penal Code 
proposed revisions have embraced the theory of limiting retributivism). 
 139 See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 140 Morris, supra note 93, at 259. 
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goals.141  Limiting retributivism has proven to be quite popular 
among states that have recently revised their sentencing codes142 
and has been endorsed by the proposed Model Penal Code as 
well.143  
As Professor Richard Frase has explained, the theory of limiting 
retributivism includes both utilitarian and retributivist notions of 
proportionality.144  The utilitarian concept of ends-benefits 
proportionality, for instance, requires that the public and private 
costs of a punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
crimes that the punishment hopes to avert.145  While retributive 
theory generally limits its evaluation of a punishment’s severity to 
the deprivations and hardships suffered by an offender,146 the 
                                                                                                                   
 141 See id. at 264–67 (giving examples of when utilitarian reasons justify unequal 
punishment of offenders, as long as all punishments are within the deserved range).  
 142 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76 & n.22 (2005) 
(noting that most United States jurisdictions have adopted some form of “limiting 
retributivism”); Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 20, at 97–104 (detailing 
Minnesota’s approach of limiting retributivism in its sentencing guidelines).  Contra 
Michael Tonry, Looking Back to See the Future of Punishment in America, 74 SOC. RESERVE 
353, 363 (2007) (“In this first decade of the twenty-first century, there is neither a 
prevailing punishment paradigm in practice nor a prevailing normative framework for 
assessing or talking about punishment in principle.”). 
 143 TD-1, supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(a) cmt. 
 144 See Richard S. Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 131, 131–47 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. 
Reitz eds., 2012) [hereinafter Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert]; Richard S. 
Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 40–49 (2008) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences] 
(describing “limiting retributivism” as a more “modest” theory than pure retributive 
theories of punishment).  
 145 See Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 144, at 44 (providing 
utilitarian arguments for punishing in proportion to the seriousness of the crime).  While 
retributive proportionality generally focuses on the harm caused or threatened by the 
offender’s criminal act and his culpability at the time of that act, the utilitarian ends-
benefits proportionality equation considers the harm threatened or inflicted by the 
offense—including the aggregate harm caused by all acts similar to the defendant’s, and the 
difficulty of detecting and deterring such actions—“but only when and to the extent that 
such punishment will prevent future crimes by this offender or others.”  See id. at 44–45 
(comparing utilitarian ends-benefits principles and retributive proportionality); see also 
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 594–95 (2005) 
(explaining the differences between utilitarian ends-benefits proportionality and retributive 
proportionality).  An offender’s culpability would only be relevant to the extent that it 
affects the likely future benefits of the punishment.  See Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison 
Sentences, supra note 144, at 45. 
 146 See Frase, supra note 145, at 595 (noting that retributive theory ignores the collateral 
consequences of imposing punishment). 
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“ends” portion of the ends-benefits proportionality equation 
considers costs borne by the offender (including unintended 
suffering),147 his family,148 and the public.149  Public costs include a 
sanction’s expense as well as “perverse incentives produced by 
harsh penalties . . . [and] the tendency for disproportionate 
penalties to undermine the public’s sense of the relative gravity of 
different crimes, and cause a public loss of respect for, and 
willingness to obey and cooperate with, criminal justice 
authorities.”150 
Under the theory of limiting retributivism, ends-benefits 
proportionality could play a role in fine-tuning the offender’s 
sentence within the broad bounds of deserved punishment.151  
Ends-benefits proportionality could result in immediate release 
when the costs exacted by a sanction have already exceeded its 
likely utilitarian benefits,152 so long as the offender has already 
satisfied his minimum deserved punishment.  The utilitarian 
proportionality analysis may also result in immediate release 
when—again, so long as requirements of minimal desert have been 
satisfied—any additional increment of the relevant sanction would 
impose costs in excess of likely future benefits and no alternative 
means of punishment exists with a more favorable proportionality 
ratio.153  
B.  PROPRIETY OF PAROLE 
For competent, mentally ill prisoners154 with a remaining 
punishment obligation,155 parole or another form of conditional 
                                                                                                                   
 147 See id. at 593–94; see also id. at 646–47 (detailing the many aspects of harm suffered 
by prisoners during and after confinement).  
 148 Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 144, at 44. 
 149 Id. at 44–45; Frase, supra note 145, at 595. 
 150 Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 144, at 45. 
 151 See supra notes 20–21, 140–141 and accompanying text.  
 152 See Frase, supra note 145, at 594 (“Including publicly- as well as privately-borne costs 
and burdens, measures should not cost more than the benefits they are expected to 
produce.”). 
 153 See Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 144, at 46–47 (discussing 
the interplay between ends-benefits and alternative-means proportionality). 
 154 See supra Part III.A.1 (concerning offenders rendered unfit subjects for retributive 
punishment). 
 155 An offender may have a remaining punishment obligation because he has not reached 
the minimum threshold of deserved punishment.  See TD-1, supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(a)(i) 
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release156 may offer an attractive means to avoid the unjust 
punishment presented by continued imprisonment.157  Parole, a 
period of conditional liberty dependent upon compliance with 
certain rules and restrictions, allows an offender the opportunity 
to reform under proper supervision and facilitates an offender’s 
reintegration into society.158  For offenders with serious mental 
health or medical issues, parole can provide for treatment in a 
more suitable environment than a correctional facility, such as a 
hospital, hospice facility, or inpatient or outpatient treatment 
facility.159  While courts and scholars typically conceptualize parole 
                                                                                                                   
(requiring sentences to fall within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of an 
offense, the harm done, and the blameworthiness of the offender).  But see Frase, supra note 
145, at 624 (observing that comparative sentencing scholarship and case law reveal a “much 
greater emphasis on avoiding disproportionately severe sentences than unduly lenient 
ones”).  Alternatively, he may have surpassed this threshold but have a remaining 
increment of punishment justified by utilitarian ends.  See TD-1, supra note 20, 
§ 1.02(2)(a)(ii) (providing for the pursuit of utilitarian goals in sentencing under the revised 
Model Penal Code, including rehabilitation of offenders, restoration to victims, and eventual 
reintegration of offenders into society).  Under the theory of limiting retributivism, the state 
cannot incarcerate an offender simply to incapacitate him or to deter others (or for any 
other utilitarian end) if the punishment would exceed the maximum quantum deemed 
deserved by his crime.  See TD-1, supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (mandating that sentences 
“in all cases [fall] within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the 
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders”); id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii) 
(authorizing the consideration of utilitarian ends “provided these goals are pursued within 
the boundaries of proportionality”). 
 156 See United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516, 519 n.6 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The essence of 
parole is a conditional release from prison before completion of sentence.”). 
 157 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE ANSWER IS 
NO: TOO LITTLE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN US FEDERAL PRISONS 75 (2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1112ForUploadSm.pdf (“While a prison term 
may have been proportionate at the time imposed, circumstances can arise that change the 
calculus against continued incarceration and in favor of some form of early release, even if 
under ongoing supervision.”).  
 158 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (“[Parole’s] purpose is to help 
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, 
without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed.”); Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 
U.S. 359, 363 (1938) (“Parole is intended to be a means of restoring offenders who are good 
social risks to society; to afford the unfortunate another opportunity by clemency—under 
guidance and control of the [Parole] Board.”). 
 159 See, e.g., MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 20, at 186 (explaining the need for community-
based intermediate punishments for offenders with addictions or mental illness because 
“prison is such an inappropriate place” for treatment); THOMAS E. FEUCHT & JOSEPH 
GFROERER, SAMHSA, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MENTAL AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 
AMONG ADULT MEN ON PROBATION OR PAROLE: SOME SUCCESS AGAINST A PERSISTENT 
CHALLENGE (2011), available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k11/NIJ_Data_Review/MentalDisor 
ders.htm (finding that probationers and parolees are more likely than the general 
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as serving a rehabilitative function,160 parole is a form of custody 
and thus may serve retributive ends as well.161  
As the punitive value of a parole term will vary by its conditions 
and duration, parole could operate as a means of effectuating 
retributive, as well as utilitarian,162 punishment.  A sophisticated 
literature has developed regarding the punitive value and 
interchangeability of sanctions.163  Commentators have generated 
principles of interchangeability and equivalency tables for various 
sanctions based on their relative impingement upon human 
interests or quality of life.164  These scholars purport to identify 
and equate units of traditional and alternative penalties such as 
confinement in a jail or prison, intermittent confinement at a 
state-designated facility, home detention with electronic 
supervision, community service, mandatory outpatient or 
inpatient treatment, fines, and probation.165  To inform and refine 
                                                                                                                   
population to receive some mental health treatment, but are also more likely to report an 
unmet need for mental health services); see also Williams et al., supra note 103, at 125 
(citing studies showing that only 75 of 1719 state correctional facilities and 6 of 102 federal 
facilities have hospices). 
 160 See, e.g., In re Grey, 522 P.2d 664, 665 (Cal. 1974) (“[T]his policy [of the parole system] 
reflects an emphasis on reformation of the offender. . . . The terms of incarceration and 
parole are to be fixed in accordance with the adjustment and social rehabilitation of the 
prisoner. . . .”). 
 161 See Bricker v. Mich. Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (“The parole 
system is a part of the state correctional system in that parole is a form of custody whereby 
the prisoner leaves his place of incarceration while remaining in the legal custody and 
control of the Board of Parole until termination of his sentence.”); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478 
(observing that parole conditions “restrict [a person’s] activities substantially beyond the 
ordinary restrictions imposed by law on an individual citizen”); see also R.A. DUFF, 
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 100–02 (2001) (suggesting that probation, 
through its elements of supervision and conditions on an individual’s liberty, may serve as a 
retributively appropriate sanction); cf. Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1753–66 (2012) (exploring the relationship between sentence 
severity and the possibility of parole). 
 162 See supra note 160.  
 163 See infra notes 165–166.  
 164 See infra note 165. 
 165 For early discussions of scaling principles and grids of sanctions of comparable severity 
see, for example, Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 55 (1987) (providing a sentencing grid that prescribes “sanction units” of comparative 
punitive bite); Andrew von Hirsch et al., Punishments in the Community and the Principles of 
Desert, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 598, 604, 607 (1989) (applying principles of desert to the choice 
among noncustodial penalties and advocating for limited substitutability and the ranking of 
penalties based on the degree of intrusion on offenders’ interests); Andrew von Hirsch & 
Martin Wasik, Non-Custodial Penalties and the Principles of Desert, 1988 CRIM. L.  REV. 555, 
GEORGIA LAW  REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  2:01 PM 
2015] MODIFYING UNJUST SENTENCES 37 
 
equivalency tables, researchers have measured how offenders 
perceive and evaluate various sanctions.166  Such principles and 
grids could be useful in identifying the period of parole and 
attendant conditions that would satisfy an offender’s remaining 
                                                                                                                   
556, 561, 569 (same).  For equivalency tables informed by offender perceptions, see sources 
listed at infra note 166.  
 166 See, e.g., David C. May et al., Predicting Offender-Generated Exchange Rates: 
Implications for a Theory of Sentence Severity, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 373, 379–80 (2005) 
(explaining how 588 offenders currently serving various punishments were surveyed through 
an eight-page questionnaire that gauged respondents’ perceptions of the severity level of nine 
alternative sanctions compared to a year in prison); Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper 
Deschenes, Perceptions of Punishment: Inmates and Staff Rank the Severity of Prison Versus 
Intermediate Sanctions, 74 PRISON J. 306, 316–17 (1994) (detailing how offenders in 
Minnesota rank the severity of common probation conditions, ranging from fines of $100 to a 
five-year prison term); William Spelman, The Severity of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 109 (1995) (describing a survey asking recently convicted offenders in 
Texas to rate how they perceived a range of punishments varying in time and mode of 
confinement in terms of severity).  Research has consistently found that offenders perceive 
community sanctions, at some level of intensity, to be as punitive as incarceration.  See, e.g., 
Petersilia & Deschenes, supra, at 321 (finding that inmates considered one year in prison as 
equivalent in severity to three years of intensive probation supervision, and six months in jail 
equivalent to one year of intensive supervision); Spelman, supra, at 121 (finding that 75% of 
offenders rated a fine or intensive probation as more severe than the lightest carceral 
sanction); Peter B. Wood & David C. May, Racial Differences in Perceptions of the Severity of 
Sanctions: A Comparison of Prison with Alternatives, 20 JUST. Q. 605, 627 (2003) (finding that 
black probationers are more likely to choose prison over alternative punishments, but that 
white probationers were more willing to serve long durations of alternative sanctions to avoid 
prison).  Offenders’ race, age, marital status, and (to a lesser extent) sex influence their 
perceptions of sanction severity.  See, e.g., Beverly R. Crank & Timothy Brezina, “Prison Will 
Either Make Ya or Break Ya”: Punishment, Deterrence, and the Criminal Lifestyle, 34 DEVIANT 
BEHAV. 782, 785 (2013) (finding that offenders who were married and had children viewed 
prison as more severe and preferred community-based sanctions); May et al., supra, at 387–91 
(finding that males, African-Americans, older offenders, and offenders with prison experience 
were willing to serve less of a given alternative to avoid imprisonment); David C. May & Peter 
B. Wood, What Influences Offenders’ Willingness to Serve Alternative Sanctions?, 85 PRISON J. 
145, 161 (2005) (finding that married offenders were more likely to agree to probation but 
much less likely to agree to spend any time in boot camp, and that marital status had no 
bearing on the amount of time an offender was willing to serve an alternative sanction).  
Researchers have also explored, to a lesser extent, perceptions of sanction severity among 
judges, correctional officials, and the public.  See, e.g., Voula Marinos, Thinking About Penal 
Equivalents, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 441, 447 (2005) (finding that members of the public who 
perceive expression of the community’s disapproval of a crime as highly important for 
purposes of sentencing are more likely to oppose fines rather than prison, compared to 
members who find denunciation less important); Nathan T. Moore et al., Offenders, Judges 
and Officers Rate the Relative Severity of Alternative Sanctions Compared to Prison, 46 J. 
OFFENDER REHABILITATION 49, 63 (2008) (finding that judges, officers, and offenders 
commonly view twelve months in medium-security prison as equivalent to six months in boot 
camp). 
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punishment obligation,167 assuming that incarceration is not the 
only sanction severe enough to communicate the degree of censure 
warranted for the offense.168 When equally effective means exist 
for achieving a given set of utilitarian benefits, alternative-means 
proportionality calls for selecting the least costly sanction.169  
In those states that recognize utilitarian and retributivist goals 
in sentencing, the perceived dangerousness of an offender with a 
serious mental illness will reduce his likelihood of securing 
parole.170  Indeed, a typical statutory precondition of parole is that 
a decisionmaker must find—by evidence of the inmate’s 
rehabilitation, good conduct in prison, family ties, job skills and 
prospects, or other evidence171—that the prisoner will abstain from 
violating the law and that his release will otherwise be compatible 
                                                                                                                   
 167 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7(7) (allowing a trial court to modify a sentence upon 
finding that the prisoner’s circumstances, including age and family circumstances, justify a 
modification under the purposes of sentencing presented in § 1.02(2)); TD-1, supra note 20, 
§ 1.02(2)(a)(i) (listing as an aim of sentencing to render a sentence whose severity is 
proportionate to the gravity of the offense, harm done to the victim, and blameworthiness of 
the offender).  
 168 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 111 
(1976) (“One reason for preferring incarceration is simply that we have not found another 
satisfactory severe punishment.”); Robert E. Harlow et al., The Severity of Intermediate 
Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 
11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 86 (1995) (noting that survey respondents viewed 
eighteen months of intermediate sanctions as equivalent to six months imprisonment, but 
that “[n]o intermediate sanctions were seen as equivalent to prison terms of 2 years or 
more”).  In addition, incarceration may be the only sanction likely to serve as an effective 
general or specific deterrent.  See DAVID C. ANDERSON, SENSIBLE JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO 
PRISON 19, 144 (1998) (noting that laws designed to reduce major violence inevitably sweep 
in lesser offenders, but that one reason given to justify incarceration is that “other sanctions 
have proved insufficient”). 
 169 See Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert, supra note 144, at 141 (“[A]mong 
equally effective means to achieve a given end, those that are less costly or burdensome 
should be preferred.”); Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 144, at 43, 
45–46 (noting that utilitarian efficiency principles support imposing the least costly of two 
equally effective means). 
 170 See TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, 
INCREASING COSTS, AND GERIATRIC RELEASE 6–9 (2010) (identifying several state geriatric 
release statutes that provide for release only when the offender is not a threat to public 
safety).  
 171 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4347 (2012) (listing job skills, anger management, 
and conflict resolution among factors to consider in determining the placement of an 
offender on parole); VA. CODE ANN.  § 53.1-155 (2012) (mandating investigation into a 
prisoner’s physical and mental condition as well as employment and attitude while in 
prison before the Parole Board’s determination).  
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with society’s welfare.172  States’ compassionate release statutes 
similarly reflect the overriding importance of public welfare by 
restricting release to those terminally ill, seriously ill, or elderly 
inmates who pose no significant public safety threat.173  When no 
set of post-release conditions reduces an offender’s risk to tolerable 
levels,174 conditional release is unlikely to be a feasible option.175  
The centrality of offender dangerousness to parole decisions is 
significant because an offender’s mental disorder will often not 
affect his likelihood of recidivism or violence.176  While some 
studies have found a modest positive correlation between psychotic 
                                                                                                                   
 172 See, e.g., Pearson v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing that public 
safety in relation to the inmate’s current dangerousness is the primary concern in the 
California Parole Board’s determination); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(c)(A) (McKinney 2012) 
(stating that the decision to release an offender for parole requires a consideration of 
whether his release is “not incompatible with the welfare of society”).  Of course, both ends-
benefits and alternative-means proportionality would allow the consideration of offender 
dangerousness and the preventative benefits of a sanction.  
 173 Klingele, supra note 77, at 492 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:10-a(I) (2004), 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-424 (2008)) (“Most jurisdictions that authorize medical parole make 
release contingent upon a showing that the inmate suffers from a ‘debilitating, 
incapacitating, or incurable medical condition’ and that he poses no risk to public safety.”); 
Laura Tobler & Kristine Goodwin, Reducing Correctional Health Care Spending, 21 
LEGISBRIEF, Mar. 2013, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/legisbrief-reducin 
g-correctional-health-care-spend.aspx (“[A]t least 41 states allow medically incapacitated or 
terminally ill inmates to leave prison early if they do not pose a public safety risk.”). 
 174 In the case of medical parole, a board of pardons or other decisionmaker will often 
condition an offender’s release on his placement in a hospital, hospice, or other venue 
capable of providing necessary health care.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-131d(a) 
(2013) (stating a parolee’s release for medical parole is conditioned on the parolee’s 
placement in a hospital, hospice, or other housing that can provide health care).  These 
settings will often be in non-secure locations. 
 175 See, e.g., State v. Verducci, 489 A.2d 715, 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (“The 
humane objective of providing appropriate care and treatment for the mentally impaired 
must be balanced against the demands of public security. . . .  Where the pathology from 
which the defendant suffers poses a serious risk to the public safety, the scale necessarily 
tips in favor of continued incarceration despite the possibility of adverse psychological 
effects that might well ensue. In that regard, we emphasize that primary among the 
hierarchy of governmental objectives is the obligation to protect the citizen against criminal 
attack.”); State v. Bacuzzi, 708 So. 2d 1065, 1069 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the trial 
court’s judgment where that court denied probation, despite evidence of bipolar and 
generalized anxiety disorders and medical testimony that the offender would be 
psychologically and physically damaged in prison, “due to the risk that the defendant would 
commit another crime . . . and that to place the defendant on a period of probation would 
depreciate the seriousness of the offense which he has committed”). 
 176 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015 2:01 PM 
40  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1 
 
symptoms and violence or criminal behavior,177 the weight of the 
evidence suggests that mental disorder and clinical symptoms play 
a negligible role, if any, in recidivism.178  Therefore, while most 
mental disorders appear not to significantly increase 
dangerousness (contrary to the widely held assumptions of the 
public,179 judges,180 parole officers,181 and probation officers182), 
                                                                                                                   
 177 See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 565 
n.257 (2012) (summarizing studies on the relationship of psychotic symptoms and violence); 
Seena Fazel & Rongqin Yu, Psychotic Disorders and Repeat Offending: Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 800, 806 (2011) (“Our main finding is in 
contrast to an influential meta-analysis that reported an inverse association with the 
psychoses . . . .”); Jillian Peterson et al., Analyzing Offense Patterns as a Function of Mental 
Illness to Test the Criminalization Hypothesis, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1217, 1221 (2010) 
(finding that the criminal behavior of a small subset of offenders was driven by their 
hallucinations or delusions).  
 178 See Johnston, supra note 177, at 564–68 & nn.274–79 (discussing meta-analyses and 
other studies finding that a major mental disorder was unrelated to recidivism); see also 
Donna L. Hall et al., Predictors of General and Violent Recidivism Among SMI Prisoners 
Returning to Communities in New York State, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 221, 229–30 
(2012) (“An individual’s psychiatric history, in contrast, did not add to the prediction of re-
arrest.  Diagnoses, level of mental health need before release from prison, or history of 
psychiatric hospitalization did not differentiate those re-arrested.”); Arthur J. Lurigio, 
Examining Prevailing Beliefs About People with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal 
Justice System, 75 FED. PROBATION 11, 15 (2011) (“[N]o pathogenesis between mental 
illness and crime has ever been established.  The untreated symptoms of the three most 
serious mental illnesses (schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression) suggest 
either no or a weak casual pathway.”).  Relatedly, the provision of mental health treatment, 
without more, is not likely to reduce the likelihood of recidivism for mentally disordered 
offenders.  Johnston, supra note 177, at 573; see also Peterson et al., supra note 177, at 1221 
(finding that only a small percentage of offenders with mental illness are likely to engage in 
criminal behavior).  
 179 See Johnston, supra note 177, at 528–29 & nn.51–52 (noting that the media’s portrayal 
of individuals with mental health disorders and social stigmas about such individuals have 
created a false stereotype that these individuals are violent because of their condition). 
 180 See, e.g., id. at 561–62 (quoting mental health court judges); SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra 
note 37, at 653 (citing studies showing that unsuccessful insanity defenses and “evidence of 
‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’ correlates positively with death sentences”).  The 
common misconception that mental illness renders an offender more dangerous may explain 
why most states do not include mental or cognitive dysfunction as grounds for early release 
in their compassionate release statutes.  See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7 cmt. b & 
reporter’s note b (noting that only a minority of state compassionate release statutes 
consider mental health). 
 181 See Jason Matejkowski, Exploring the Moderating Effects of Mental Illness on Parole 
Release Decisions, 75 FED. PROBATION 19, 19 (2011) (noting that while mental illness is not 
a central factor in risk analysis by parole officers, individuals with mental health disorders 
are less likely to receive parole than non-mentally ill inmates). 
 182 See Jennifer Eno Louden & Jennifer L. Skeem, How Do Probation Officers Assess and 
Manage Recidivism and Violence Risk for Probationers with Mental Disorder? An 
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they do not appear to reduce an individual’s dangerousness, either.  
Even dementia, which some medical professionals have argued 
should serve as the basis for compassionate release,183 may not 
lessen an individual’s likelihood of committing crimes.184  Since 
most mental disorders do not dampen recidivism, a mentally 
disordered individual typically will need some other condition or 
set of experiences to demonstrate that his release will cohere with 
public safety in order to satisfy statutory requirements for parole. 
Second, courts may be unlikely to release an offender on parole 
when his underlying crime is serious.  A number of scholars have 
argued that the sanction of incarceration, as opposed to an 
alternative sanction such as probation with mandatory treatment 
and supervision, is necessary to communicate the degree of 
censure warranted by some crimes.185  Under the same logic, a 
judge could justify continued incarceration by stressing factors 
that affect the minimum proportionality of a sentence, namely the 
offender’s culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the harm to 
the victim.186  The fact that many states’ compassionate release 
                                                                                                                   
Experimental Investigation, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 22, 31 (2012) (noting that probation 
officers view probationers with mental health disorders as high-risk). 
 183 See generally Williams et al., supra note 103, at 125 (proposing national criteria for the 
compassionate release of three categories of seriously ill prisoners, including prisoners with 
dementia). 
 184 In fact, individuals with dementia may be more likely to experience agitation or exhibit 
aggression.  See, e.g., Constantine G. Lyketsos et al., Mental and Behavioral Disturbances 
in Dementia: Findings from the Cache County Study on Memory in Aging, 157 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 708, 711–12 (2000) (finding that 23.7% of patients with dementia experienced 
agitation or aggression compared to 2.8% of patients without dementia, and that rates of 
agitation and aggression increased with severity of dementia); Constantine G. Lyketsos et 
al., Physical Aggression in Dementia Patients and Its Relationship to Depression, 156 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 66, 67–68 (1999) (finding that 15% of community-residing patients referred for 
evaluation to the Johns Hopkins Neuropsychiatry and Memory Group engaged in physically 
aggressive behavior and noting a link between depression and violence in persons with 
dementia); Rebecca Eastley & Gordon K. Wilcock, Prevalence and Correlates of Aggressive 
Behaviours Occurring in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease, 12 INT’L J. GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY 484, 484 (1997) (finding that the presence of dyspraxia increased the likelihood 
of assaultive behavior in a sample of patients diagnosed as suffering from dementia and 
living in non-institutional settings); cf. Jeremiah Heinik et al., Dementia and Crime: A 
Forensic Psychiatry Unit Study in Israel, 9 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 491, 492 (1994) 
(finding no significant differences among the crimes allegedly committed by persons with 
dementia, functional psychosis, and personality disorders).  
 185 See supra note 168.  Of course, under a retributive theory of punishment, continued 
incarceration would not be appropriate beyond an offender’s desert. 
 186 See TD-1, supra note 20, § 1.02(2)(a)(i), (ii) (listing “the gravity of offenses, the harms 
done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders” as factors to consider in 
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statutes disqualify individuals convicted of high-level felonies from 
relief reflects a determination to incarcerate those who commit the 
most serious crimes even when prisoners no longer pose a public 
safety threat.187  
In summary, parole or conditional release may serve as an 
appropriate option for some offenders with serious mental illnesses 
who have not yet received their quantum of deserved or otherwise 
justified punishment but for whom prison poses a substantial 
threat of serious harm and whose mental health would benefit 
from treatment outside the correctional environment. Since 
mental disorder typically does not reduce an individual’s threat of 
violence or likelihood of recidivism, however, offenders with 
mental illnesses may not satisfy the common statutory 
requirement of posing little or no threat to public safety.  In 
addition, parole may not be available for those offenders who 
committed serious crimes.  For these two categories of “dangerous” 
offenders, which may constitute a sizeable proportion of the 
mentally ill prisoner population,188 a sentencing judge will often 
need to look beyond parole to remedy unjust carceral sentences.  
C.  PROPRIETY OF SHORTENED PRISON TERMS 
A final remedial option available to judges in sentence 
modification hearings is early but non-immediate release.  The 
                                                                                                                   
sentencing); cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra 
note 157, at 59–61 (recounting how considerations of the seriousness of the crime and the 
number of years served impact prison wardens’ evaluations of compassionate release 
petitions).  
 187 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51c(3) (West 2012) (precluding medical parole for 
those convicted of certain crimes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-404(d) (2014) (proscribing parole 
leave for those convicted of certain sex crimes); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-131k(a) (2014) 
(allowing compassionate release to any inmate, except those convicted of a “capital felony”); 
Stacy L. Gavin, What Happens to the Correctional System When a Right to Health Care 
Meets Sentencing Reform, 7 NAELA J. 249, 257 (2011) (“Generally, medical parole is not 
available to inmates convicted of violent crimes or felonies.”). 
 188 See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 121, at 7 (“Among State prisoners who had a mental 
health problem, nearly half (49%) had a violent offense as their most serious offense, 
followed by property (20%) and drug offenses (19%).”); PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 174463, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT 
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
mhtip.pdf (“Based on information from personal interviews, State prison inmates with a 
mental condition were more likely than other inmates to be incarcerated for a violent 
offense (53% compared to 46%) . . . .”).  
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equal impact theory,189 described above in reference to immediate 
release,190 would support the use of sentence modification statutes 
to shorten the prison term of a mentally ill offender who has 
experienced disproportionately harsh or otherwise unjust 
conditions of confinement.191  In short, a resentencing judge, 
treating conditions of confinement or offender hardship as units of 
punishment, could reduce an offender’s sentence in recognition 
that a shorter prison term under harsh conditions roughly equates 
to a longer term under gentle conditions.192  Whereas immediate 
release could compensate only for past conditions, the option of 
early but non-immediate release could compensate both for harsh, 
past conditions and for harsh, anticipated conditions.193 
Reducing a prisoner’s sentence on the basis of anticipated harsh 
prison conditions (and attendant hardships), however, is more 
problematic than reducing a sentence in light of past harm from 
conditions of confinement.194  In the latter situation, the hardship 
would already have been endured, and allowing that hardship to 
satisfy a portion of an offender’s punishment obligation would not 
necessarily convey judicial acceptance of the conditions responsible 
for the hardship.  Rather, shortening an offender’s sentence could 
be one form of remedy, not necessarily the exclusive one,195 for the 
inmate’s hardship or disproportionately harsh experience in 
prison.  The shorter sentence could even be coupled with a 
directive that the inmate serve the remainder of his sentence in 
                                                                                                                   
 189 See supra notes 73–74. 
 190 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 191 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.7(7), (8), cmt. I (noting the broad discretion 
compassionate release statutes give judges and providing for that discretion in the proposed 
Model Penal Code revision).  
 192 See supra note 74 (noting the controversial nature of this treatment of unintended 
consequences of incarceration). 
 193 See MOORE, supra note 120, at 11 (arguing for sentence adjustment in response to 
inmate suffering or vulnerability). 
 194 For a defense of sentence mitigation on the basis of anticipated hardship and an 
evaluation of criticisms of this approach, see Johnston, supra note 28, at 200–07 
(considering likelihood of prison violence), 221–29 (considering reduced carceral terms on 
the basis of foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the state). 
 195 Id. at 205–06 (noting the possible availability of tort or criminal remedies for harm 
that occurs in prison); cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 53, at 961 (“If an unconstitutional 
tort occurs during the punitive encounter, the state’s obligation may reasonably take the 
form of compensation, apology, injunctive relief, or administrative reform.  Such harm to 
the offender does not necessitate the remission of the offender’s balance of punishment; 
there are other currencies the state can use.”). 
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different or more gentle conditions.  In the former situation, 
however, the judge would be shortening a sentence on the basis of 
future conditions that the judge expects will occur.  In these 
circumstances, the reduced sentence would convey acquiescence in, 
and implicit approval of, the anticipated conditions.196  Some 
critics have even suggested that, under this approach, if the 
expected conditions or hardships did not occur, a longer sentence 
would be necessary to effectuate proportionate punishment.197  
Critically, granting a reduced prison term on the basis of 
anticipated harsh conditions would be improper and immoral 
unless some valid penal aim suffices to justify the consequent 
harm.198  As Professor Adam Kolber has observed, it is unlikely 
that a legitimate retributive aim can justify the most harmful side-
effects of incarceration.199  If this is true, then a judge should not 
grant early, but non-immediate, release due to anticipated harm 
from harsh prison conditions.200  
Thus, under the equal impact theory, a judge should only 
reduce an offender’s prison sentence, leaving a portion of the term 
to be served, when one of two conditions can be met.  First, a 
sentence reduction for past, harsh conditions would be acceptable 
when a judge believes that an inmate’s conditions will materially 
improve.  Second, a reduction for both past and anticipated harm 
from prison conditions could be permissible when the foreseen 
future conditions and harsh treatment are morally justifiable.201  
To the extent that neither of these conditions is satisfied, a judge’s 
ability to remedy unjust sentences for offenders who have not 
reached their quantum of deserved punishment, but do not qualify 
for conditional release, is limited. 
                                                                                                                   
 196 See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of Guideline 
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 573 (2006) (arguing that federal courts that reduce prison 
sentences for extreme vulnerability to victimization are, in practice, sentencing vulnerable 
defendants to prison terms “at rape”). 
 197 See E-mail from Dan Markel, Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ., to author (Feb. 6, 
2012, 16:51 EST) (on file with author). 
 198 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 204 n.262 (discussing the doctrine of double effect). 
 199 See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 22–23 (2012).  
 200 Accordingly, some jurisdictions’ practice of granting discounts to offenders’ carceral 
terms on the basis of anticipated hardship may be morally unjustifiable.  See supra note 75.  
Under this reasoning, it would also be morally unacceptable to allow a carceral sentence, 
carrying anticipated unjustified harm, to proceed to its full term. 
 201 See supra notes 194–200. 
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*** 
In summary, the typical options available to judges at sentence 
modification hearings offer appropriate remedies for only a subset 
of those mentally ill prisoners suffering an unjust punishment.  
Immediate release will be an appropriate response for those 
offenders who are unfit subjects for retributive punishment and for 
those who have reached their maximum quantum of deserved 
punishment.  It may also be an appropriate response, so long as an 
offender has already satisfied his minimum deserved punishment, 
when the costs exacted by incarceration have already exceeded its 
likely utilitarian benefits, or when any additional increment of 
incarceration would impose costs in excess of likely future benefits 
and no alternative means of punishment exists with a more 
favorable proportionality ratio.  Shortened terms of confinement 
will only be morally permissible when an inmate’s conditions of 
confinement are likely to materially improve or if foreseen future, 
harsh conditions and harm are morally justifiable.  Conditional 
release offers an appropriate and sufficient remedy for the unjust 
punishment of those mentally ill prisoners with a remaining 
punishment obligation, but this option often will not be available 
for those offenders who continue to pose a public safety threat or 
who committed serious crimes.  These prisoners are currently left 
without remedy, as judges lack the means to ensure the justness of 
continued confinement. 
IV.  PROPOSAL: AUTHORIZE JUDICIAL TAILORING OF CONDITIONS OF 
CONFINEMENT 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that typical sentence 
modification options may be unavailing for those mentally 
disordered prisoners who do not qualify for conditional or 
immediate release, and who are likely to experience unjustifiably 
harsh conditions if they continue to be incarcerated.  This Part 
offers a solution: authorize judges to tailor prisoners’ conditions of 
confinement, even in the absence of an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  This remedy, ordered in response to a defendant’s 
motion for sentence modification and upon a finding of past and 
likely future unjust punishment, would allow judges to ensure that 
incarceration constitutes a just and appropriate sanction.  Because 
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the proposed authority would infringe upon prison officials’ 
abilities to manage correctional affairs, judges’ discretion should 
be limited to modifying conditions when an inmate’s continued 
confinement would be inhumane or unjustifiably harsh, and when 
neither immediate nor conditional release is a feasible option.  The 
sections below outline the scope of such power and how it might 
work in practice, discuss the benefits of such expanded authority, 
and respond to likely objections.  Future work will explore the 
mechanics of implementation in more detail.202 
A.  THE SCOPE OF THE MODIFICATION POWER 
A number of modifications to an offender’s carceral sentence are 
possible,203 and the necessity of a modification for the justness of a 
sentence will vary by the inmate’s particular needs, vulnerability 
to harm, and experience in prison to date.  Possible modifications 
differ in their efficaciousness, efficiencies, and degrees of 
intrusiveness to the administration of prisons.  Prior work has 
detailed possible modifications that judges could order in the 
context of an original sentencing.204  These conditions include 
directing that offenders receive—or not receive—certain treatment 
in prison, disqualifying sites of confinement particularly likely to 
exacerbate an individual’s disorder, and designating facilities with 
certain treatment or protective options.205  This section will offer 
an example to show how tailoring an inmate’s conditions of 
confinement could offer an effective remedy to an otherwise unjust 
                                                                                                                   
 202 One issue worthy of exploration is whether a mentally ill prisoner should have a right 
to a state-provided expert in establishing the harshness of his conditions of confinement, 
the effects of incarceration, and the suitability of conditional release.  See Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 83–84 (1985) (holding that due process entitles an indigent defendant to expert 
assistance in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding when the state introduces 
psychiatric evidence of his future dangerousness). 
 203 See Johnston, supra note 38, at Part IV.B–F (exploring a number of possible sentence 
modifications). 
 204 See id. (exploring a number of possible conditions). 
 205 Id.; cf. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-9.7 (1989), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standard 
s_mentalhealth_blk.html#7-9.7 (providing that “[s]everely mentally ill . . . sentenced offenders 
should be treated in a mental health or mental retardation facility, preferably under the 
supervision of the jurisdiction’s department of mental health” and that “[m]ental 
health . . . services should be available within the adult correctional facility for offenders 
whose mental illness . . . is not severe enough to necessitate commitment to a mental health or 
mental retardation facility”).  
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punishment.  It will then suggest an existing statutory analogue 
from the education context that could be useful in guiding the 
implementation of this idea.206  
1.  Example.  Let us return to the hypothetical prisoner with 
bipolar disorder and psychosis who has been confined in 
administrative segregation for ten years of his fifteen-year 
sentence.  Assume that nothing suggests the prison’s utilization of 
a more therapeutic housing arrangement in the future.  Let us also 
assume that a judge, entertaining the inmate’s motion for sentence 
modification, finds that the inmate deserves further punishment 
and that, because of the seriousness of the original criminal act or 
the inmate’s current state of dangerousness, he is not an 
appropriate candidate for conditional release.  Nevertheless, the 
judge also finds that the inmate’s exacerbated disorder and the 
mental and emotional pain caused by his solitary confinement 
threaten the proportionality and perhaps humaneness of his 
sentence.207  To reduce the harm caused by the inmate’s 
confinement in this restrictive environment, the judge, if so 
authorized, could establish standards for the offender’s treatment.  
For instance, the judge could order that any period spent in 
segregation must take place under conditions recommended by the 
American Psychiatric Association.208  These conditions include 
receipt of maximal access to structured, clinically indicated, out-of-
cell programming and therapeutic activities, treatment in 
appropriate, out-of-cell programming space, and regular, 
unstructured, out-of-cell recreation.209  
Alternatively, a judge could find that more intrusive 
modifications are necessary to render continued confinement a just 
sanction.  The judge may decide that the inmate’s confinement in 
                                                                                                                   
 206 I am grateful to Professors Rebecca Morrow, Adam Gershowitz, and Tim Holbrook for 
suggesting this analogy. 
 207 Again, the meaning ascribed to these terms does not necessarily reflect their usage in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  See supra Part II.B.1, 3. 
 208 See infra notes 209–210. 
 209 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Segregation of Prisoners with Mental Illness, 
in APA OFFICIAL ACTIONS 35, 35 (2012), available at http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Docu 
me nts/2013_04_AC_06c_APA_ps2012_PrizSeg.pdf [hereinafter APA, Position Statement]; see 
also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 5 (2d ed. 2000) 
(providing standards for the provision of care, regular assessment by qualified mental health 
professionals, and the removal from segregation of inmates “in current, severe psychiatric 
crisis”). 
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isolation, given his severe mental illness and experience in 
isolation to date, exacts too great a psychological toll to continue 
indefinitely.210  The judge could limit correctional authorities’ 
ability to subject this particular inmate to that treatment by, for 
instance, requiring that any term in isolation exceeding some 
duration receive judicial approval.  Another option could involve 
ordering that the inmate receive an alternative housing 
arrangement such as one in an intermediate care facility211 or a 
secure mental health hospital, unless a qualified mental health 
professional deems such placement unnecessary for the inmate’s 
                                                                                                                   
 210 A number of courts have concluded that the prolonged confinement of inmates with 
preexisting serious mental illnesses in extremely isolated conditions constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  See Johnston, supra note 28, at 178 & 
n.156 (citing cases discussing confinement in supermax facilities); Thomas L. Hafemeister 
& Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of Imposing 
Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1, 25–31 (2012) (discussing cases holding that prolonged supermax solitary 
confinement of mentally ill offenders violates constitutional standards); see also Elizabeth 
Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and Far Too Usual 
Punishment, 47 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2411845 (arguing that solitary confinement is cruel and unusual punishment and 
that extreme solitary confinement is counterproductive to public safety, institutional safety, 
prisoner welfare, and cost efficiency).  Many professional organizations now recommend 
that penal institutions avoid the prolonged segregation of inmates with serious mental 
illnesses.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS 55 (3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publi  
cations/criminal_justice_standards/Treatment_of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS] (“No prisoner diagnosed with serious mental 
illness should be placed in long-term segregated housing.”); ABA, Position Statement, supra 
note 209, at 35 (“Prolonged segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare 
exceptions, should be avoided due to the potential for harm to such inmates.”); AM. PUB. 
HEALTH ASS’N, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AS A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE, Policy No. 201310 (2013), 
available at http://www.apha.org/policy-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-d 
atabase/2014/07/14/13/30/solitary-confinement-as-a-public-health-issue (calling on correctional 
authorities to “[e]xclude from solitary confinement prisoners with serious mental illnesses”); 
SOC’Y OF CORR. PHYSICIANS, POSITION STATEMENT, RESTRICTED HOUSING OF MENTALLY ILL 
INMATES (2013), available at http://societyofcorrectionalphysicians.org/resources/position-state 
ments/restricted-housing-of-mentally-ill-inmates (acknowledging “that prolonged segregation 
of inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, violates basic tenets of mental 
health treatment” and that “[i]nmates who are seriously mentally ill should be either 
excluded from prolonged segregation status (i.e. beyond 4 weeks) or the conditions of their 
confinement should be modified in a manner that allows for adequate out-of-cell structured 
therapeutic activities and adequate time in an appropriately designed outdoor exercise 
area”). 
 211 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 38, at 670–73 (describing the prevalence and benefits of 
intermediate care facilities). 
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mental health.212  Under these arrangements, the individual could 
continue his confinement and experience the full range of justified 
deprivations of liberty while avoiding a key source of documented, 
unjustified, and substantial harm. 
2.  Analogy for Implementation: Individualized Education 
Programs.  The adoption of this proposal would, in essence, result 
in judicially created individualized incarceration plans for some 
subset of mentally disordered prisoners.  Some inmates currently 
benefit from similar individualized treatment secured through 
injunctions ordered in response to successful litigation under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional prison conditions.213  Given how 
difficult it is to establish the subjective component of the Eighth 
Amendment test for intolerable prison conditions,214 however, 
allowing resentencing judges to order individualized treatment in 
response to actual or foreseen objective harm would greatly 
expand those numbers.  The example of individualized education 
programs, which are widely available across the United States, 
may provide useful guidance for how to achieve similar 
individualization in correctional settings.215  
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA),216 states accepting federal funds must provide a free, 
appropriate public education that is tailored to the unique needs of 
each child with a disability through an individualized education 
program (IEP).217  Qualifying children include those suffering from 
                                                                                                                   
 212 See ABA STANDARDS: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, supra note 210, at 180 (“A 
correctional facility should provide prisoners diagnosed with mental illness, mental 
retardation, or other cognitive impairments appropriate housing assignments and 
programming opportunities in accordance with their diagnoses, vulnerabilities, functional 
impairments, and treatment or habilitation plans.  A correctional agency should develop a 
range of housing options for such prisoners, including high security housing; residential 
housing with various privilege levels dependent upon treatment and security assessments; 
and transition housing to facilitate placement in general population or release from 
custody.”).  
 213 See supra note 128.  
 214 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; infra notes 252–255 and accompanying text. 
 215 See supra note 206. 
 216 20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1483 (2014). 
 217 See id. § 1401 (defining “free appropriate public education”); id. § 1401(14) (defining 
IEP).  While the IDEA only applies to children in elementary and secondary school, colleges 
must provide reasonable accommodations to make their programs accessible to students 
with disabilities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.  See Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12150 
(2014), Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2014).  For a pithy comparison of the 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015 2:01 PM 
50  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1 
 
a serious emotional disturbance, autism, traumatic brain injury, 
intellectual disability, specific learning disability, or other health 
impairment, “who, by reason thereof, need[ ] special education and 
related services.”218  A parent or a teacher may refer a child for 
evaluation.219  At that point, the school district must assess the 
child and determine whether he is eligible under the IDEA as a 
child with a disability.220  Parents may seek an alternative 
evaluation of their child at state expense.221  If a child qualifies as 
having a recognized disability, then the school, in consultation 
with the child’s family, will create an IEP for the child.222 
An IEP specifies the educational placement and services to be 
provided to the child, given his particular educational needs.223  As 
Professor Mark Weber has explained: 
The IEP must contain a statement of the child’s 
present levels of academic achievement and functional 
performance; a statement of measurable annual goals; 
a description of how the child’s progress toward 
meeting the goals will be measured; a statement of the 
special education and related services and 
supplementary services to be provided the child and 
program modifications and supports; an explanation of 
the extent to which the child will not be participating 
with nondisabled children in general education classes; 
a listing of accommodations on state and district 
assessments; a statement of dates to begin services 
and their frequency, location, and duration; and a 
                                                                                                                   
responsibilities of educational institutions under the three statutes, see Amy G. Dell, 
Transition: There Are No IEP’s in College, TECH-NJ (Jan. 20, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://www. 
tcnj.edu/~technj/2004/transition.htm. 
 218 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a). 
 219 Mark C. Weber, All Areas of Suspected Disability, 59 LOY. L. REV. 289, 293 (2013). 
 220 Id. 
 221 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2014); Weber, supra note 219, at 296 (citing this provision and 
explaining that “[i]f the parent requests an independent evaluation, it is up to the school 
district either to file a due process complaint to show that its evaluation is appropriate, or 
to make sure that the independent evaluation is provided”). 
 222 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (specifying that the child’s parents are part of the IEP team); 
Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education 
Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 424–25 (2011); Weber, supra note 219, at 297–98. 
 223 Romberg, supra note 222, at 424.  
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specification of goals and services for post-secondary 
transition if the child is sixteen or older.224 
The IDEA includes provisions governing the disciplinary 
measures that can be taken in relation to children with a 
disability.225  The statute also requires notice to a child’s parents of 
any changes to his IEP and allows participation in meetings 
regarding its content or implementation.226  Parents may request a 
due process hearing if they are not satisfied with the IEP or other 
elements of the child’s entitlement to a free, appropriate public 
education.227  The appeal process includes an ultimate appeal to a 
state or federal court.228  
Future work will probe the extent to which IEPs provide a 
useful example for the individualized incarceration of mentally 
disordered inmates, but a few preliminary observations are 
appropriate at this juncture.  First, compelling similarities exist 
between both schools and prisons, and disabled students and 
mentally disordered inmates.  Officials at both types of publicly-
funded institutions are given broad discretion to maintain security 
and order and achieve their institutional missions,229 yet these 
interests do not override an individual’s interest in an appropriate 
                                                                                                                   
 224 Weber, supra note 219, at 297; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (defining IEP). 
 225 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k); see also Paolo Annino, The Revised IDEA: Will It Help Children 
with Disabilities?, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (2005) (noting that the 
IDEA disciplinary procedures include “diluted due process protections”). 
 226 See Gabriela Brizuela, Making an “IDEA” a Reality: Providing a Free and Appropriate 
Public Education for Children with Disabilities Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 595, 603 (2011) (“The IDEA also includes safeguards 
mandating that the child’s parents participate in any meetings pertaining to their child’s 
IEP and that they receive written notice of any proposed changes to the IEP.”).  
 227 See Salma A. Khaleq, The Sanctioning Authority of Hearing Officers in Special 
Education Cases, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 4–5 (2012) (explaining the 
process for parents’ requesting a due process hearing). 
 228 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also Khaleq, supra note 227, at 4–5 (discussing the appeal 
process); Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Reauthorized 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) of 2004: Where Do 
Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 68 (2007) (“The law afford[s] 
parents the opportunity to file for an impartial hearing at the local educational level, appeal 
that decision at the state educational level, and then file a civil action in either state or 
federal district court for a review of the state educational determination.”). 
 229 See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment 
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 687–86 (commenting on the Court’s decision to strengthen 
schools’ rights to institutional discretion in the context of free speech). 
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education, health, or safety.230  In addition, both IEPs and 
individualized incarceration would serve to protect members of a 
vulnerable population from harm.  Both children and prisoners 
must rely on institutional officials to satisfy their needs.231  
Moreover, both disabled students and mentally disordered inmates 
may possess less developed cognitive facilities and less behavioral 
control than their non-ill peers.232  Without the mandate of 
individualized treatment, these individuals would likely suffer 
neglect and some degree of harm as institutions cater to the needs 
of the more fully abled majority.  This may be particularly true 
when disciplinary methods do not take disability into account.233  
In addition, the process of creating and overseeing IEPs, though 
not without criticism,234 appears to offer some useful lessons for 
the implementation of individualized incarceration.  First, the 
process of identifying qualifying students demonstrates that third-
party referrals will be important for recognizing individuals in 
need of tailored placement or services.235  This is likely to be the 
case, as well, for inmates with mental disorders, who may find it 
difficult to understand their rights or utilize available grievance 
procedures.  One potential option in a correctional setting would be 
to allow for the filing of anonymous reports to identify prisoners in 
need of special accommodation.  As in the different (though not 
unrelated) context of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, these 
                                                                                                                   
 230 See id. at 697 (observing that, even when balancing students’ First Amendment 
interest against the schools’ interests, the Court should favor the best educational outcome 
for students). 
 231 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 64, at 173–74 (advocating for continuing 
jurisdiction over a prisoner’s incarceration by invoking an analogy to guardianship law: 
“Although adult in the eyes of the law, prisoners are, in many senses, subject to the kind of 
control that parents and others exercise over children and for that reason are in need of a 
higher level of judicial supervision.”). 
 232 Cf. Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled 
Students, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2000) (introducing the controversial problems 
surrounding disciplining disabled students whose behavioral problems threaten the 
educational environment). 
 233 See supra note 210 (discussing this neglect and harm with regards to solitary 
confinement). 
 234 See, e.g., Blau, supra note 228, at 74–75 (discussing the power imbalance between 
schools and parents in developing and implementing IEPs and how this imbalance creates 
“an almost insurmountable barrier to relationship building and true collaboration between 
the parties”); Romberg, supra note 222, at 417 (suggesting that “the IDEA’s procedural 
protections are not effective in practice and are not particularly important, even in theory”). 
 235 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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reports could go to correctional (or outside) authorities and trigger 
an official inquiry into the individual’s plight and needs.236  
Legislatures should consider providing that defense counsel 
receive copies of third-party reports to facilitate motions for 
sentence modification.237 
Second, the experience with IEPs demonstrates that successful 
accommodations often rely on collaboration between educational 
officials and a child’s parents or guardian. Indeed, the involvement 
of school officials is critical to the discernment of educational goals 
and necessary and possible accommodations, as well as to the 
implementation of an IEP.238  Likewise, once a broader right to 
just and humane conditions of confinement is established, inmates 
and their family members, friends, and defense attorneys should 
work with correctional officials to establish individualized 
treatment that is responsive to inmates’ mental health needs and 
vulnerabilities throughout the course of an individual’s 
confinement.  At a sentence modification hearing, a judge should 
consider evidence presented by correctional officials on what 
modifications are necessary and possible at a relevant institution 
or within the broader correctional system.  Finally, judges’ 
experience in resolving disputes regarding IEPs suggests that they 
may be well-equipped to engage in the individualized fact-finding 
necessary for individualized incarceration. 
B.  RATIONALE AND JUSTIFICATION 
Several reasons support authorizing courts to tailor prisoners’ 
conditions of confinement when necessary to prevent unjust 
punishment.  First and most fundamentally, particular conditions 
of confinement may be integral to a carceral punishment’s 
humaneness or proportionality, and thus judicial control over 
those conditions may be necessary to ensure the accomplishment 
                                                                                                                   
 236 See Nat’l Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 
37,106, 37,109 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115), available at http://www. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf (summarizing standards and noting that 
they require that agencies provide multiple internal reporting avenues, at least one way to 
report abuse to an entity distinct from the agency, a means for reporting inmates to remain 
anonymous, and a way for third-parties to report abuse on behalf of an inmate).   
 237 The reports could also be useful in establishing Eighth Amendment violations. 
 238 See Romberg, supra note 222, at 424–25 (explaining that schools and parents 
collaborate to create an individualized IEP for each child’s educational needs). 
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of sentencing objectives.239  As Professor Alan Gluck has argued, 
“In determining appropriate sentences, judges consider the needs 
of both society and the convicted defendant.  Accordingly, they 
should be able to ensure that the inmate’s treatment is consistent 
with the purpose of the sentence.”240  Similarly, Professor Cheryl 
Kessler has maintained that courts’ sentencing function engenders 
a “special judicial duty” to oversee the correctional process: 
“Control over the correctional process is a logical and necessary 
extension of the judicial concern that the nature and duration of 
confinement are reasonably related to its purpose. If this 
relationship does not exist, judicial sentencing to prison is 
pointless, arbitrary, and merely advisory.”241  Without the ability 
to respond to unjust conditions of confinement, courts merely 
possess a superficial power to determine just and appropriate 
punishment.242  
Indeed, in the past, professional organizations have recognized 
the importance of courts’ continuing authority to modify sentences 
in response to evolving conditions of confinement.243  The 
American Bar Association in 1977 advocated that “[s]entencing 
courts should be authorized . . . to reduce a sentence or modify its 
terms whenever the court finds after an open hearing that the 
treatment of the prisoner or the conditions under which he lives 
are not related to the purpose of the sentence.”244  Similarly, the 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals proposed that “[c]ourts should retain jurisdiction . . . to 
determine whether an offender is subjected to conditions, 
requirements, or authority that are unconstitutional, undesirable, 
or not rationally related to the purpose of the sentence, when an 
                                                                                                                   
 239 See supra Part II.B; infra notes 240–244. 
 240 Alan H. Gluck, Prisoners’ Free Speech Rights: The Right to Receive Publications, 1977 
WASH. U. L.Q. 649, 672. 
 241 Cheryl A. Kessler, First Amendment Mailing Rights of Parolees and Prison Inmates: A 
Higher Standard of Judicial Protection, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 913, 941 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
 242 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 643 (explaining how “[a]llowing judges to tailor 
disordered offenders’ prison sentences in light of their vulnerabilities would enable judges 
to better fulfill their institutional function and achieve the goals of punishment”). 
 243 See infra notes 244–249 and accompanying text. 
 244 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 66, at 409.  
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offender raises these issues.”245  The Commission recommended 
that sentencing courts receive authorization to reduce a sentence 
or modify its terms when they find that new factors dictate such 
modification or that the purpose of an original sentence is not 
being fulfilled.246  The commentary explained the rationale 
underlying this authority in this way:  
The sentence imposed by the court is binding on two 
parties, the offender and the correctional agency.  The 
offender is required to serve the sentence imposed.  
The correctional agency should be required to execute 
the sentence the sentencing court envisioned.  The 
inherent power of a court continually to supervise its 
own orders should apply to the sentencing decision.  
Either party should be entitled to return to the court 
when the other party violates the order.247  
The Commission specified that courts’ power should extend 
beyond remedying constitutional violations to allow, for instance, 
review of “simple negligence in medical service and tort cases.”248  
Only with this authority, similar to a court’s continuing 
jurisdiction over equity decrees, could a court ensure that an 
inmate “will be treated as a human being with human and 
constitutional rights.”249  Thus, when a prisoner files a motion for 
sentence modification and a judge subsequently finds that the 
inmate’s current and likely future confinement constitutes an 
unjust penalty—but that neither immediate nor conditional 
release is an appropriate option—then she should be authorized to 
remove apparent sources of disproportionality or inhumaneness 
through a sentence modification order.  Without such a power, 
                                                                                                                   
 245 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 64, § 5.9, at 173; see also id. at 173 cmt. (“This 
standard substitutes the view that the sentence is analogous to decrees in equity cases, 
subject to further judicial scrutiny if the conditions of the decree are breached.”). 
 246 Id. § 5.9, at 173 & 174 cmt.  
 247 Id. at 173 cmt.  
 248 Id. at 174 cmt. 
 249 Id. 
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judges will be unable to fulfill their institutional function, and the 
unjustness may continue unabated.250  
Second, such a power could be useful in supplementing the 
anemic protection offered by the Eighth Amendment, which does 
little to guarantee humane and appropriate conditions of 
confinement.251  As commentators have observed, the subjective 
prong of the Eighth Amendment effectively strips the Amendment 
of much of its force.252  Especially in the context of neglect within 
an institution, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to identify a 
particular correctional official with the requisite knowledge of 
conditions that pose “a substantial risk of serious harm” to an 
individual prisoner.253  In addition, as Professor James Park has 
reflected, “Knowing inaction is not the only source of inhumane 
prison conditions.  It is apathy and an unwillingness to search out 
and prevent sources of harm that cause injury to prisoners.”254  
Worse still, the Eighth Amendment standard essentially breeds 
passivity and inattention because the knowledge requirement 
incentivizes correctional officials to avoid gaining the requisite 
knowledge.255 Allowing a judge to modify an inmate’s sentence to 
                                                                                                                   
 250 Products of the sentence modification process may prove useful in helping an inmate 
establish the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment standard in a Section 1983 action 
for cruel and unusual prison conditions.  Namely, the evidence adduced at the hearing or 
through the motions process could establish, later, that a correctional official knew of the 
existence of conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm and then failed to take 
reasonable measures to abate the risk.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 251 See infra notes 252–255 and accompanying text. 
 252 See, e.g., Park, supra note 60, at 441 (“By only requiring prison officials to act when 
they have knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, the knowledge requirement 
emasculates the duty to protect.”); supra note 60. 
 253 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (“Inhumane 
prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and inactions by numerous 
officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of time. In those 
circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent should be examined . . . . In truth, intent 
simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a 
prison system.”); cf. Ristroph, supra note 60, at 167–68 (“[P]arsing of the concept of 
punishment is arbitrary and incoherent.  Contemporary punishment is a complex set of 
practices carried out by a number of official actors and institutions.  The use of official 
intent to circumscribe the category of ‘punishment’ . . . denies both the complexity of 
punishment and its status as a set of practices.” (footnote omitted)). 
 254 Park, supra note 60, at 441. 
 255 See id. at 443 (discussing the passivity of the substantial risk of the serious harm 
requirement); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, at Pt. VIII 
(2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report8html#_1_50 (observing 
that the deliberate indifference standard and actual knowledge requirement “create 
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address conditions that meet some objective standard of 
harmfulness or that are otherwise unjustified by the purposes of 
punishment would serve as an effective counterforce to this 
deleterious incentive. 
Finally, allowing a resentencing judge to modify conditions of 
confinement when necessary for the justness of a sentence would 
bring the treatment of seriously disordered prisoners to light and 
subject conditions of confinement to review and public debate.  
Currently, prison decisions regarding assessment, treatment, 
housing, and discipline receive little scrutiny.256  The public nature 
of a sentence modification proceeding would impart a degree of 
transparency and accountability to the treatment of these 
vulnerable prisoners.257  This attention may well prompt broader 
legislative and executive reform.258 
C.  RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
While the benefits are substantial, a number of objections may 
be leveled against this proposal.  One likely objection is that 
judges are incompetent to assess prisoners’ mental health, identify 
harsh and unjust conditions of confinement, and modify conditions 
accordingly.  Judges often assess individuals’ mental health for 
                                                                                                                   
perverse incentives for authorities to ignore the problem” of prisoner-on-prisoner sexual 
abuse).  Prison officials may also perceive the under-detection and treatment of mental 
disorders as offering valuable (short-term) cost-savings.  Indeed, commentators have long 
complained that prison officials overlook the mental disorders of offenders who slip through 
the mental health screening process at intake and do not pose a security threat.  See 
Johnston, supra note 38, at 633 n.45 (listing sources that note correctional officers’ inability 
to distinguish between mentally ill and “disgruntled” inmates). 
 256 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 630–43. 
 257 See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing 
Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 689 (1993) (“[T]he judiciary is the discretionary point 
that is most accountable.  Compared to any other discretionary point—prosecutors, 
corrections administrators, or parole boards—judicial decisions are public, as is the 
information on which they base their decisions (open at least to those involved with the 
case, if not to the public at large).  Judges are expected to provide reasons for their decisions 
and there is a strong tradition of review for most decisions—although not for sentencing 
decisions.”). 
 258 See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Standards of 
Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 551, 562 (1978) (“[A]n activist trend of judicial supervision may induce legislative 
and administrative action to remedy undesirable conditions of prison confinement.”). 
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purposes of guilt and sentencing,259 however, and often structure 
probation conditions to respond to offenders’ mental health 
needs.260  Assessment of mental health also plays a key role in 
mental health courts and some civil proceedings, including civil 
commitment proceedings,261 benefits cases,262 and custody 
disputes.263  Moreover, many judges are familiar with sites and 
conditions of confinement264 and would presumably reach their 
findings after considering documentary evidence or testimony by 
mental health experts and correctional officials, much as they do 
in the context of Section 1983 suits challenging conditions of 
confinement as Eighth Amendment violations.265  Indeed, judges 
are currently encouraged to—and do, in a substantial proportion of 
cases266—offer facility and treatment recommendations at 
                                                                                                                   
 259 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 28, at 151–52 & nn.18–20 (explaining how a defendant’s 
mental illness may be taken into consideration at sentencing); supra notes 75–76 and 
accompanying text (discussing state statutes that permit judges to consider the potential 
undue hardship to the defendant, sometimes due to mental illness, as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing). 
 260 Typically, pretrial services will chronicle an accused’s mental health history in the 
report it prepares for bail determination, and a probation officer will include a defendant’s 
mental health history in the presentencing report created for the court.  See Johnston, 
supra note 28, at 159 & nn.49–51 (“Many state statutes require probation officers to include 
an offender’s mental health history in the presentencing report. . . .”). 
 261 See supra Part III.A & note 94. 
 262 See C. Georffrey Weirich & Ashoo K. Sharma, Tracking the Path to Parity Between 
Mental and Physical Health Benefits, 17 LAB. LAW. 469, 474–78 (2002) (discussing common 
mental health benefits litigation issues).  
 263 See Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: 
Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgments, 46 FAM. L.Q. 135, 154–61 (2002) 
(discussing the key role of mental health experts in child custody disputes).  
 264 See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Judges take 
their sentencing responsibilities very seriously and are familiar with the various [Bureau of 
Prisons] institutions and programs.  Their recommendations as to the execution of 
sentences are carefully thought out and are important to them.”). 
 265 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1931–35, 1947 (2011) (affirming the relief 
ordered by a three-judge panel to remedy an Eighth Amendment violation due to 
inadequate mental health care and detailing the expert evidence presented at trial). 
 266 See Todd A. Bussert, “Real Time” Designation, Proximity to Home and the Importance 
of Judicial Recommendations, FEDERAL PRISON BLOG (July 12, 2012), http://www.federalpri 
sonblog.com/2012/07/real-time-designation-proximity-to-home-the-importance-of-judicial-rec 
ommendations.html (relaying that, between June 2011 through March 2012, there were 
40,563 judicial recommendations and 94,621 initial designations, meaning that judges 
offered recommendations for approximately 43% of sentences during that period); see also 
Sonya Cole & Todd A. Bussert, BOP Presentation at U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Annual 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Seminar 2 (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2009/014a_BOP_Issues. 
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sentencing.267  While these recommendations are not binding, 
evidence suggests that correctional authorities, at least at the 
federal level, honor judicial recommendations in the vast majority 
of cases, a strong indication of their feasibility and 
reasonableness.268  
A second objection is that authorizing judges to interfere in 
individual inmates’ conditions of confinement would wreak havoc 
on prison administration.  The force of this concern is considerable.  
A number of compelling reasons support retaining prison 
administrators’ control over carceral conditions.269  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[r]unning a prison is an 
inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, 
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive 
branches of government.”270  Moreover, ordering a costly change 
                                                                                                                   
pdf (identifying these common judicial recommendations: requests for specific programming 
(e.g., vocational training, drug abuse treatment, or work assignments), confinement in a 
specific facility or medical center, and sentence calculation). 
 267 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4)(B) (2012) (providing that the Bureau of Prisons may 
consider a judge’s recommendation of a certain type of facility when designating a prisoner’s 
place of confinement); FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT, 
P5100.08, ch. 3, at 3, 4, 7 (2006), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_00 
8.pdf (noting various ways in which the Bureau of Prisons uses judges’ recommendations to 
classify and designate prisoners).  
 268 See ALAN ELLIS & J. MICHAEL HENDERSON, FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK 33–34 (2005) 
(citing Bureau of Prisons statistics showing that the Bureau honors about 85% of judicial 
recommendations for facility placements when the defendant qualifies for the institution 
recommended); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247 (noting that “the BOP follows judicial 
recommendations in approximately 85–90 percent of all cases”); Bussert, supra note 266 
(reporting that the Bureau followed or partially followed 66% of judicial recommendations 
made between June 2011 and March 2012); Cole & Bussert, supra note 266, at 2 (reporting 
that the Bureau completely followed 62%, and partially followed 11%, of judicial 
recommendations).  Common reasons for not accommodating a judicial request include 
conflicts between the recommended facility and the inmate’s security level, the inmate’s 
ineligibility for the recommended program, security concerns, and the unavailability of the 
requested program at the recommended facility.  Id. at 3.  While this evidence suggests that 
judges’ recommendations are reasonable, it does not offer decisive proof of that fact.  See 
Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2123, 2137–40 (2010) (arguing that an accumulation of experience does not 
necessarily warrant an assumption of competence). 
 269 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.  
 270 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (explaining that courts are ill-equipped to deal with prison 
reform because of the complexity of running a penal institution); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (observing that overcoming the “Herculean obstacles” to effectively 
maintaining order and discipline, preventing unauthorized access or escape, and 
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may yield systemic effects that a court cannot anticipate.271  This 
proposal could result in a misallocation of scarce resources, for 
instance, as correctional officials prioritize inmates with sentence 
modification orders and thus are unable to channel resources to 
the neediest and most vulnerable offenders.  It also may result in 
designated offenders’ receiving more costly treatment or housing 
than is necessary given their current mental health statuses. 
Two safeguards may suffice to respond to these concerns and to 
minimize undue encroachment into correctional affairs.  First, 
legislation could specify that a court must allow correctional 
officials to testify or otherwise offer evidence in response to any 
proposed carceral condition before its imposition.  Second, courts 
should permit the government to move to reopen a sentence if it 
believes that an ordered condition is inappropriate, unreasonable, 
or infeasible.272  This approach would allow correctional 
authorities to challenge those conditions that create intolerable 
security risks, become unnecessary in light of an offender’s 
evolving mental health needs, or are impracticable due to resource 
constraints. 
A third objection is that the pressures inherent in judicial 
elections may undermine the effectiveness of the proposal.  Thirty-
nine states elect at least some appellate or major trial court 
judges.273  Since the Citizens United v. FEC decision in 2010,274 
money has been pouring into these elections, with an estimated 
                                                                                                                   
rehabilitating prisoners “require[s] expertise, comprehensive planning, and the 
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative 
and executive branches of government”). 
 271 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91–93 (upholding a prohibition on correspondence between 
correctional institutions because the risk of dangerous correspondence threatened the order 
and security of multiple institutions and because the burden of checking every piece of mail 
was too costly an imposition on the system).  
 272 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 660–61 (arguing for these safeguards in the context of 
an original sentencing). 
 273 Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Knight Rises: The Growing Role of 
Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 501, 502 (2013); Competitive Elections, JUSTICE AT STAKE, http://www.justiceatstake. 
org/issues/state_court_issues/competitive-elections/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 274 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that, under the First Amendment, “the Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”). 
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$56.4 million spent on judicial races in 2011–2012.275  Much of this 
money is used for advertising,276 the most damning of which 
extrapolates from a candidate’s involvement in a particular case to 
depict her as, for example, “sympathetic to rapists,” 
“volunteer[ing] to help free a terrorist,” or “protect[ing] . . . sex 
offenders.”277  This negative advertising generates political 
pressure to appear tough on crime (and criminals).278  Multiple 
studies show that judges are more likely to rule against criminal 
defendants as elections approach,279 and a 2013 study by the 
Center for American Progress reports that, “[a]s state supreme 
court campaigns become more expensive and more partisan, the 
fear of being portrayed as ‘soft on crime’ is leading courts to rule 
more often for prosecutors and against criminal defendants.”280 
However, the extent to which these forces would deter elected 
judges from altering conditions of confinement through sentence 
modification is unclear.  While it seems likely that the fear of 
being depicted as “soft on crime” may engender reluctance to 
release offenders into the community, a judge’s modification of 
                                                                                                                   
 275 ALICIA BANNON ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2011–12: HOW NEW 
WAVES OF SPECIAL INTEREST SPENDING RAISED THE STAKES FOR FAIR COURTS 2 (2013), 
available at http://newpoliticsreport.org/content/uploads/JAS-NewPolitics2012-Online.pdf. 
 276 Id. at 1 (“The 2011–12 cycle saw $33.7 million in [television] spending, far exceeding 
the previous two-year record of $26.6 million in 2007–08.”). 
 277 Id.; see also BILLY CORRIHER, CRIMINALS AND CAMPAIGN CASH: THE IMPACT OF 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPENDING ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 2–3 (2013), available at http:// 
cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CampaignCriminalCash-4.pdf (“Most 
of these attack ads allege that a certain judge is soft on crime, telling voters that he or she 
ruled in favor of a violent criminal without any context or discussion of the legal issue at 
stake.”). 
 278 See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519–20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(warning of the danger that Alabama trial judges, who face partisan election every six 
years, “will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized 
capital cases” and remarking upon the “political climate in which judges who covet higher 
office—or who merely wish to remain judges—must constantly profess their fealty to the 
death penalty”). 
 279 See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice 
Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 247 (2004) (concluding from a study 
of 22,095 Pennsylvania criminal cases in the 1990s that elected judges will become more 
punitive as standing for reelection nears); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and 
Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623, 661 (2009) (demonstrating that, when judges face 
Republican retention agents in partisan reelections, they are more likely to vote against 
criminals in criminal appeals and concluding that “elected state supreme court judges 
routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money”). 
 280 CORRIHER, supra note 277, at 1.  
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carceral conditions would allow an inmate to remain confined and 
thus would present no obvious public safety threat.  Indeed, a 
judge may opt to modify conditions of confinement in lieu of 
conditional release, and thus could frame her decision as pro-state.  
If conditions of confinement were indisputably harsh or cruel, 
modification of conditions may even be the state’s preferred 
remedy (as opposed to release).  Thus, the phenomenon of judicial 
elections may increase the demand for modification of carceral 
conditions instead of decrease it.  
A fourth objection involves other practical impediments such as 
caseload pressures and existing judicial loyalties.  Trial courts 
already struggle under heavy caseloads281 and thus may lack the 
capacity to handle droves of sentence modification motions.282  
This may be particularly true when modification of carceral 
conditions exists as a possible remedy since consideration of this 
option would presumably require a hearing and the taking of 
evidence.  Additionally, trial judges may be unlikely to second-
guess their own sentences or those imposed by their colleagues on 
the bench.  For these reasons, were a legislature to adopt this 
proposal, it should consider appointing a slate of retired judges to 
review sentence modification motions.283  These judges would be at 
least somewhat insulated from the political pressures referenced 
above (and thus be more likely to consider immediate and 
conditional release, when warranted); would develop expertise on 
prison facilities, treatment options, and conditions; could develop a 
uniform approach to handling these motions; and would avoid 
overtaxing existing trial court resources.284 Retired judges also 
                                                                                                                   
 281 See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2012 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: 
STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 40 fig.2 (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/docume 
nts/2012-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf (depicting that the total number of filings per judicial 
position in California Superior Courts was over 4,500 in 2011); Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. 
Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem 
and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 327–28 (1994) (showing that the total civil 
and criminal filings per federal district judge steadily increased from 1970–1992); Jeanine 
Blackett Lutzenhiser, Comment, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s Public 
Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203, 1235 (2012) (noting that 
Washington trial courts “handle heavy caseloads with scarce resources”). 
 282 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6 cmt. d (discussing this problem). 
 283 The American Law Institute has recommended the creation of a panel of acting or 
retired judges to entertain “second-look” sentence modification motions filed by prisoners 
who have served fifteen years of any sentence of imprisonment.  See id. § 305.6(1) & cmt. d. 
 284 Id. § 305.6 cmt. d (listing these advantages of the retired judge panel).  
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may feel less personal loyalty to the judges who issued the original 
sentences, allowing them to consider offenders’ sentences and 
prison experiences more objectively.285  
The final objection involves the cost of this proposal and the 
absence of any clear limiting principle.  Taking the latter point 
first, sound reasons may exist for limiting the power to modify 
conditions of confinement to inmates with serious mental 
disorders.286  While other populations are also vulnerable to harm 
in prison,287 inmates with serious mental illnesses have unique 
needs and encounter particular dangers.  First, the stress of prison 
can exacerbate an individual’s mental disorder and induce 
psychological degeneration.288  In other words, the antitherapeutic 
environment of prison can make a mentally ill individual sicker, 
thus requiring special treatment.289  Second, individuals with 
serious mental illnesses face, in addition to a host of physical 
dangers, the specific threat of a loss of cognitive function.290  
Preservation of cognitive function is necessary for maintenance of 
a defendant’s hold on reality, personality, and autonomy, and is 
thus a particularly acute interest.291  Third, mental disorder is 
often difficult to diagnose, and the nature of the screening system 
                                                                                                                   
 285 See id.  Under this proposal, sentence modification would function as a resentencing.  
Assessment of the actual purposes of punishment that motivated an original sentencing 
would be unnecessary.  Rather, the court—upon finding the existence of past and likely 
future unjust punishment—would assess whether, to what extent, in what form, and under 
what conditions, further punishment is warranted.  Cf. id. cmt. f (suggesting that a judicial 
decisionmaker in a sentence modification hearing should review a sentence de novo).  
 286 Alternatively, however, sound reasons also support judges’ ability to modify the 
carceral conditions for any offender who has experienced and will likely continue to 
experience unjustifiably harsh or inhumane conditions.  Indeed, this stance is arguably 
more principled and would flow from the court’s obligation to provide proportionate and 
humane punishment to all convicted offenders.  See supra notes 239–255 and accompanying 
text. 
 287 See supra note 31 (listing risk factors for sexual assault in prison). 
 288 See, e.g., Shelia M. B. Holton, Managing and Treating Mentally Disordered Offenders 
in Jails and Prisons, in CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH HANDBOOK 101, 108–10 (Thomas 
J. Fagan & Robert K. Ax eds., 2003) (discussing the impact of incarceration on seriously 
mentally ill inmates); Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, A Tragedy for Prisoners: 
Prisons as Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 140 (2006) 
(describing how prison conditions can “dramatically aggravate” the condition of a mentally 
ill inmate). 
 289 This observation may also hold true for some medical conditions. 
 290 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 629 (identifying the threat of loss of cognitive function 
that many mentally ill prisoners face). 
 291 See id.  
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utilized at prison intake centers means that some disorders will be 
overlooked, leading to a delay in treatment and possible placement 
in an unsuitable environment.292  Once confined, correctional 
officials may be prone to misinterpret symptoms of mental illness 
as disorderly conduct or malingering.293  Courts can play an 
important corrective function in identifying individuals in need of 
particularized treatment through an evaluation of evidence and, if 
necessary, an adversarial hearing.294  Fourth, prisons may rely on 
means of protection that actually endanger the health of 
individuals with major mental disorders.  Prisons commonly 
protect offenders susceptible to physical abuse by placing them in 
protective custody or solitary confinement, but the prolonged 
confinement of a mentally disordered offender in isolated and 
extremely restrictive conditions may result in severe psychological 
damage.295  Fifth, many prisons provide inadequate mental health 
treatment,296 especially in solitary housing units,297 leading to 
predictable psychological harm. 
Therefore, it may be appropriate to confine the power to modify 
carceral conditions to the context of inmates with serious mental 
disorders, on the rationale that these inmates are especially at 
risk of experiencing disproportionately harsh or inhumane 
treatment in prison.298 Researchers estimate that approximately 
                                                                                                                   
 292 See id. at 631–36 (discussing the shortcomings of prison intake procedures). 
 293 See id. at 633 & n.48, 635 (discussing how correctional officers can misinterpret 
symptomatic illness as disorderly conduct).  Other vulnerabilities, such as physical 
disability, diminutive stature, and first-offender status, may be easier to identify and 
harder to feign.  This observation does not necessarily apply to all vulnerabilities to serious 
harm in prison, such as gay or bisexual orientation.  See supra note 31.  For a sensitive and 
illuminating exploration of the segregation of gay and transgender inmates in a Los Angeles 
jail, see generally Sharon Dolovich, Two Models of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and 
Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 965 (2012). 
 294 See generally Johnston, supra note 38 (articulating reasons for expanding judges’ 
sentencing power to tailor conditions of confinement for mentally ill prisoners). 
 295 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 174–78 & nn.147–57 (discussing the growing consensus 
that solitary confinement is particularly damaging for inmates with serious mental illness); 
supra note 210.  
 296 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 161 & n.61 (discussing the inadequate mental health 
treatment in many prisons).  
 297 See id. at 161 & n.62.  
 298 On the other hand, some commentators have suggested that equalizing prison 
conditions between mentally ill and non-ill inmates ignores and stands in tension with 
disparities in treatment that exist outside of prison.  For instance, Professor Kolber has 
argued that severity of punishment should be measured by deviance from subjects’ baseline 
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16% of prisoners have a mental disorder,299 but many inmates’ 
mental disorders can be adequately controlled with medication.300  
One category of mentally disordered prisoners particularly in need 
of this proposal may be those who are housed for extended periods 
of time in isolation and who face a substantial risk of psychological 
harm.301  While human rights groups and social scientists have 
reflected on the disproportionate presence of mentally disordered 
                                                                                                                   
states.  See Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 
1573 (2009) (arguing that the severity of punishment depends on the extent of the change 
from the prisoner’s baseline status); see also id. at 1594–1600 (arguing that punishment 
should include knowingly imposed negative subjective experiences, such as distress).  This 
argument could be read to suggest that, if mentally disordered individuals suffer 
disproportionately outside of prison, then their greater suffering inside prison is 
appropriate to ensure that the actual punishment experienced by equally culpable ill and 
non-ill offenders is of equal severity. 
  Many studies confirm that individuals with serious mental disorders report higher 
victimization rates than non-ill individuals in the community.  See, e.g., Lisa A. Goodman et 
al., Recent Victimization in Women and Men with Severe Mental Illness: Prevalence and 
Correlates, 14 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 615, 627 (2001) (demonstrating that men and women 
with serious mental illnesses are at a high risk of victimization); Linda A. Teplin et al., 
Crime Victimization in Adults with Severe Mental Illness: Comparison with the National 
Crime Victimization Survey, 62 GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (2005) (clarifying that persons 
with serious mental illnesses are eleven times more likely to be victimized than the general 
population).  However, allowing these victimization rates to establish a permissible baseline 
for victimization in prison would serve both to normalize the intolerable predation of 
individuals with mental disorders in the community and to sanction the cruel treatment of 
mentally disordered prisoners.  A state’s failure to provide necessary care and protection to 
inmates should not be tolerated within a humane society, and indeed is not permissible 
under the Eighth Amendment.  See supra note 35; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 
(1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates and 
stressing that it “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of 
which is ‘reasonable safety’ ”). 
 299 See Kenneth Adams & Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 
35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 913, 913 (2008) (discussing studies that establish that a 
substantial number of mentally ill persons are in state and federal prisons); HOLLY HILLS 
ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES 3 (2004), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf (discussing 
prevalence of mental illness in prison systems).  This rate exceeds the incidence of mental 
disorder within the community.  See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 121, at 3 (reporting that 
around 11% of persons age eighteen or older in the U.S. general population satisfy DSM-IV 
criteria for symptoms of a mental health disorder).  
 300 See HILLS ET AL., supra note 299, at 8 (noting evidence that medication, along with 
other treatment interventions, has helped prisons manage mentally ill inmates). 
 301 See generally supra notes 41–42, 295.  Indeed, a number of courts and professional 
organizations have concluded that the prolonged confinement of inmates with preexisting 
serious mental illnesses in extremely isolated conditions constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment or is otherwise intolerable.  See supra 
note 210. 
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inmates in administrative segregation,302 no reliable data exist on 
the number of mentally disordered defendants currently housed in 
extremely isolated environments.303  Therefore, to the extent that 
focusing on mentally disordered inmates in this particular setting 
is appropriate, it is difficult to estimate the number of inmates the 
proposal might affect.304 
Cost estimates are also elusive.  Fact and expert discovery, 
motions practice, and sentence modification hearings are certainly 
all expensive, as would be the creation of a panel of judges to 
entertain these motions.305  The largest possible expense, however, 
would stem from the mandate to increase the quantity and quality 
of mental health care provided to inmates.  Compliance with court 
directives could require the construction of new facilities and 
certainly would necessitate increased staffing.  It is impossible to 
concretize the cost of complying with potential sentencing orders 
and to determine how this figure might exceed the cost of care that 
                                                                                                                   
 302 See Johnston, supra note 28, at 176 (“Estimates vary, but most researchers aver that 
inmates with preexisting mental illnesses comprise 20% to 50% of the total solitary 
population, which is two to three times their prevalence in the general prison population.”).  
The vast majority of people who end up in solitary confinement are not “incorrigibly violent 
criminals; instead, many are severely mentally ill or cognitively disabled prisoners, who 
find it difficult to function in prison settings or to understand and follow prison rules.”  
Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights, and Human Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 127 (2012) (written statement of the Am. 
Civil Liberties Union). 
 303 Indeed, we lack reliable estimates of the total population currently confined in isolation. 
See Johnston, supra note 28, at 174–75 n.140 (listing estimates of the total population in 
maximum security prisons); The Inhumane Practice of Solitary Confinement, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Apr. 11, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-11/solitary-confine 
ment-makes-u-s-prisons-cruel-and-unusual.html (“The total number of prisoners held in 
solitary confinement in the U.S. is difficult to ascertain.  According to the federal government, 
there were more than 81,000 prisoners in ‘restricted housing units’ in state and federal 
institutions in 2005.  That number doesn’t include prisoners held in local jails or immigration 
detention centers.  (A more recent census isn’t available.)”). 
 304 It is unclear why courts should be able to modify the sentences of those inmates housed 
in isolation but not those suffering disproportionately harsh or inhumane conditions in the 
general prison population for whom housing in isolation is not a humane protective 
response.  If this observation has merit, then the number of individuals who may seek 
sentence modification may be much greater.  See, e.g., BECK ET AL., supra note 39, at 24, 26–
28 (documenting the percentage of inmates reporting various mental health problems and 
types of sexual victimization perpetrated by staff and other inmates in prison). 
 305 See TD-2, supra note 18, § 305.6 cmt. a (discussing costs associated with a second look 
provision for prisoners who have served at least fifteen years of any sentence of 
incarceration). 
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would likely be provided by prisons officials without courts’ 
prompting.  As a basic matter, it is certainly true that caring for 
inmates with serious mental illnesses is more expensive than 
confining inmates of average health.306  This greater cost stems in 
part from the increased staffing needs of this population, as well 
as necessary examination, medication, and hospitalization 
expenses.307  
Notably, however, any increased costs associated with a higher 
degree of care may be offset by several sources of savings. One 
reason mentally ill inmates tend to be more costly than non-ill 
inmates is their increased likelihood to violate prison rules, lose 
                                                                                                                   
 306 See, e.g., Steve Maynard, Incarcerating the Mentally Ill Doesn’t Help Them, and It’s 
Expensive, THE NEWS TRIB. (June 16, 2013), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2013/06/16/2640 
431_incarcerating-the-mentally-ill.html?rh=1 (reporting that the Tacoma Sheriff’s 
Department charges around $90 a day to house an inmate, while “the county’s budget and 
finance director said the cost of housing a seriously mentally ill inmate at the jail is estimated 
at $170 per day in chronic cases and $209 per day in acute cases”); Stephanie Mencimer, There 
Are 10 Times as Many Mentally Ill People Behind State Bars as In State Hospitals, MOTHER 
JONES (Apr. 8, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/ 04/record-numbers-m 
entally-ill-prisons-and-jails (“In Washington state, . . . in 2009, the most seriously mentally ill 
inmates cost more than $100,000 a year to confine, compared with $30,000 for others.”); FRED 
OSHER ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, ADULTS WITH BEHAVIORAL 
HEALTH NEEDS UNDER CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION: A SHARED FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM AND PROMOTING RECOVERY 8 (2012), available at https://www.bsa.gov/Publicatio 
ns/CSG_Behaviorial_Framework.PDF (“In Connecticut, the overall annual per-inmate health 
cost is estimated at $4,780, while health costs at the corrections facility for inmates with 
serious mental illness were $12,000. In Florida’s Broward County Jail, the daily inmate cost is 
$78, but the cost rises to $125 per day for inmates with mental illness.”); E. FULLER TORREY ET 
AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS 
THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 10 (2010), available at  http://www.treatmentadvo 
cacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf (“In Texas prisons ‘the 
average prisoner costs the state about $22,000 a year,’ but ‘prisoners with mental illness range 
from $30,000 to $50,000 a year.’ ”). 
 307 TORREY ET AL., supra note 306, at 9–10 (identifying increased staffing needs, psychiatric 
examinations, and medications as contributing to the high cost of confining seriously mentally 
ill inmates). One option for securing the necessary funds would be for state legislatures to 
guarantee parity in funding for mental health treatment in carceral facilities with funding 
provided for a comparative community-based population. See Prue Salasky, Report: Virginia 
Jails Not Providing Appropriate Mental Health Treatment, DAILY PRESS (Jan. 14, 2014), http:// 
articles.dailypress.com/2014-01-14/health/dp-nws-mental-health-jail-report-0115-20140115_1_ 
jails-mental-health-services-health-treatment (citing a report from the Office of the Attorney 
General calling for, among other things, parity in funding for mental health treatment in jails 
and the community).  Allowing state funds to follow a patient—in essence, authorizing 
reimbursement regardless of who provides services—would permit better continuity of care 
and, potentially, higher quality care. Id. 
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good time, and serve their full sentences.308 Providing a higher 
level of mental health care in a therapeutic environment could 
reduce those costs.309 Studies indicate that providing high quality 
mental health treatment to offenders with serious mental 
disorders in therapeutic environments can lower rates of 
disciplinary infractions, victimization, seclusion, use of crisis care, 
and hospitalization, all of which convey significant cost savings.310   
Additional benefits to the state, financial and otherwise, could 
emanate from increased mental health services. Providing 
adequate mental health care should result in less civil rights 
litigation alleging Eighth Amendment violations, and fewer 
expensive consent decrees and injunctions ordering the provision 
of mental health care to inmates.311  Moreover, studies show a 
                                                                                                                   
 308 See, e.g., Donald W. Morgan et al., The Adaptation to Prison by Individuals with 
Schizophrenia, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 427, 427–33 (1993) (comparing the 
adaptation of prisoners with schizophrenia with that of a control group and finding that 
those with schizophrenia performed inferiorly to the control group for all outcome variables, 
including number of infractions, number of lockups, days in lockup, ability to obtain a job in 
prison, and ability to obtain release from prison; also, finding that prisoners with 
schizophrenia were less likely to earn good time and more likely to have longer terms of 
incarceration than non-mentally-ill inmates with similar offenses); TORREY ET AL. supra 
note 306, at 10 (discussing, and providing localized support for, the assertion that mentally 
ill inmates serve longer carceral terms than non-ill counterparts and “are often major 
management problems”). 
 309 See HILLS ET AL., supra note 299, at 8 (observing that special needs housing units for 
inmates with chronic mental illness who require a therapeutic environment “can reduce 
serious rule infractions, suicide attempts, correctional discipline, seclusion, hospitalization, 
and the need for crisis intervention”). 
 310 See Johnston, supra note 38, at 671–72 & nn.276–80 (reporting the results of studies 
showing that treatment in intermediate care facilities results in lower levels of mental 
disorder, disciplinary violations, and victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings for 
prisons); Ward S. Condelli et al., Intermediate Care Programs for Inmates with Psychiatric 
Disorders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 63, 67–68 (1994) (finding, in New York 
intermediate care programs, significant reductions in use of crisis care, seclusion, and 
hospitalization of program inmates, and reporting significant reductions in very serious 
infractions and suicide attempts during the six months after admission to the program); 
HILLS ET AL., supra note 299, at 9 (“The effectiveness of specialized mental health units for 
the care of inmates with serious mental illness who are unable to cope with participating in 
daily activities with the general population but who are not in need of hospital-level care 
has been demonstrated in numerous prison systems. . . .  These units have moderate costs, 
which are more than offset by the decrease in the use of inpatient psychiatric care and 
improvements in institutional safety and security.”). 
 311 See, e.g., Editorial, Mental Illness in California Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/opinion/mental-illness-in-california-prisons.html?_r=0 
(chronicling the “more than 100 court orders in the past 17 years to improve the care after 
[an] inmate class-action suit was filed in 1995” and the continued federal oversight over 
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positive correlation between sexual and physical victimization and 
rates of recidivism,312 suggesting that avoidance of victimization 
could lead to decreased recidivism. Finally, studies suggest that 
the provision of mental health treatment—especially if paired with 
treatment of criminogenic risk factors and continuing treatment in 
the community upon release—can also reduce recidivism.313  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judicial sentence modification has become popular as a possible 
means to save money, reduce prison overcrowding, and prevent 
unjust and inappropriate punishment.  To remedy the unjust 
punishment endured by prisoners with mental illnesses, however, 
legislatures should consider expanding judges’ arsenal of 
                                                                                                                   
California prisons due to . . . inadequate mental health care); Michael S. Vaughn, Civil 
Liability Against Prison Officials for Prescribing and Dispensing Medication and Drugs to 
Prison Inmates, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 315, 318 (1997) (“[P]rison administrators who attempt to 
reduce health care expenditures by supplying inmates with inefficacious medication 
ultimately may cost their jurisdictions more money in legal fees and civil litigation than in 
medication if their cost-cutting attempts amount to deliberate indifference to the serious 
medical needs of inmates.”). 
 312 See SHELLEY JOHNSON LISTWAN ET AL., THE PRISON EXPERIENCE AND REENTRY: 
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION ON COMING HOME 74–75 (2012), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238083.pdf (finding that experiencing violent 
victimization in prison resulted in higher rates of recidivism).   
 313  See, e.g., OSHER ET AL., supra note 306, at 21–36 (discussing the “Risk-Need-
Responsivity” model for how correctional authorities should identify and prioritize individuals 
to receive certain interventions, how mental illness affects an individual’s responsivity to 
interventions targeting criminogenic risk factors, and proposing a framework “to reduce 
recidivism and advance public health and individual recovery”); Robert D. Morgan et al., 
Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research Synthesis, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 
(2011) (synthesizing the results from twenty-six empirical studies and finding that programs 
“specifically designed to meet the psychiatric and criminal justice needs of offenders with 
mental illness . . . produce significant reductions in psychiatric and criminal recidivism”); Hall 
et al., supra note 178, at 230  (studying seriously mentally ill offenders in New York and 
finding an inverse relationship between participation in treatment and subsequent arrest, and 
stating that comprehensive services may help “some seriously mentally ill persons avoid re-
arrest after release from prison”); Stanley Sacks et al., Randomized Trial of a Reentry 
Modified Therapeutic Community for Offenders with Co-Occurring Disorders: Crime 
Outcomes, 42 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 247, 247 (2012) (finding that participants in 
community treatment programs were significantly less likely to reoffend than offenders in the 
parole supervision system); Ronald J. Smith et al., Forensic Continuum of Care with Assertive 
Community Treatment (ACT) for Persons Recovering from Co-Occurring Disabilities: Long-
Term Outcomes, 33 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 207, 207, 210 tbl.1 (2010) (finding positive 
results for offenders found not guilty by reason of insanity participating in a community 
treatment program including low levels of criminal recidivism); cf. supra note 178. 
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dispositional options.  Immediate release, shortened sentences, 
and conditional release may be appropriate modification options 
for many offenders.  These options, however, will not suffice to 
ensure just punishment for those offenders who face 
disproportionately harsh conditions of confinement but who are 
not candidates for immediate or conditional release.  For these 
offenders, legislatures should consider authorizing judges to 
modify conditions of confinement.  By permitting judges to remove 
proven and anticipated sources of unjust harm found behind 
prison walls, legislatures could equip judges with the tools they 
need to secure proportionate and humane sentences, ameliorate 
the unjust hardship of individual prisoners, and perhaps prompt 
systemic changes in the treatment of vulnerable inmates. 
 
